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Matter of Knipple v. Flanagan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Oct 14, 1999
265 A.D.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

Opinion

Decided: October 14, 1999

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Tobin, J.).


On March 10, 1998, the parties agreed to a modified visitation order which increased petitioner's visitation by allowing him to care for their son when he was not in school. Thereafter, petitioner, acting pro se, sought a downward modification of his support obligation, asserting that the increased visitation arrangement, among other things, constituted a change in circumstances. When the Hearing Examiner, on respondent's motion, dismissed the application without a hearing, concluding that petitioner had not established his right to a modification of his support obligation, and Family Court denied petitioner's objections to the Hearing Examiner's determination, this appeal followed.

We affirm. Modification of a child support award can be had if there has been a substantial change in circumstances (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]; Matter of Hanehan v. Hanehan, 260 A.D.2d 685, 686; 687 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468; see also, Matter of Scholet v. Newell, 229 A.D.2d 621, 622). That petitioner's visitation has been increased — apparently the child now spends 40% of his time with petitioner and 46% with respondent — does not per se dictate a downward modification. Indeed, the financial obligation of the noncustodial parent must be computed irrespective of the amount of visitation, and then adjusted only if the amount is determined to be unjust or inappropriate due to one or more of the factors identified by Family Court Act § 413 (1) (f) (see, Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 729; Matter of Fernandez v. Fernandez, 256 A.D.2d 901). On this record no adjustment is called for. It appears that to take advantage of increased visitation with his son, petitioner gave up a part-time coaching position which paid him $2,250 per year. This loss of income did not work a substantial change in his financial situation, as it was offset by the fact that his obligation for the child's after-school care was effectively eliminated because of his increased visitation. As petitioner failed to raise a genuine issue regarding whether he experienced a substantial change of circumstances, Family Court cannot be faulted for dispensing with an evidentiary hearing (see, Matter of Scholet v. Newell, supra, at 622; see also, Trainor v. Trainor, 188 A.D.2d 461).

We have reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

CARDONA, P.J., SPAIN, CARPINELLO AND GRAFFEO, JJ., CONCUR.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.


Summaries of

Matter of Knipple v. Flanagan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Oct 14, 1999
265 A.D.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
Case details for

Matter of Knipple v. Flanagan

Case Details

Full title:IN THE MATTER OF DOUG KNIPPLE, Appellant, v. MILDRED FLANAGAN, Respondent

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Oct 14, 1999

Citations

265 A.D.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
696 N.Y.S.2d 273

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