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Matter of Kessman v. Ulster Co. Dept., S.S

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Feb 25, 1999
258 A.D.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

Opinion

February 25, 1999


In October 1994, petitioner's decedent (then age 81), became a resident of a nursing home in Ulster County, where she remained until her death in November 1997. Decedent's spouse, Herbert Kessman (hereinafter Kessman), applied for medical assistance (see, Social Services Law § 366 [al [5]) on decedent's behalf in September 1996. The application was denied by respondent Ulster County Department of Social Services, following a hearing, on the ground that the combined household resources of Kessman and decedent were so high as to render decedent ineligible for medical assistance. That determination was, in turn, confirmed by respondent State Department of Health.

Petitioner, who is the son of decedent and Kessman and also the administrator of decedent's estate, thereafter commenced this proceeding challenging the denial of medical assistance to decedent. It is his contention that respondents erred by factoring into the calculation of decedent's combined household resources the sum of $122,169.50, i.e., the equity value of Kessman's 25% interest in the assets of a family-owned corporation known as Kessman Golf Properties, Inc. (hereinafter Kessman Golf), a company which operates a driving range.

To determine eligibility for medical assistance under Social Services Law § 366 (1) (a) (5), the applicant/recipient's available financial resources must be calculated to determine if they exceed his or her medical expenses. If they do, the applicant/recipient will be deemed ineligible, at least until such expenses equal or exceed the "excess resource standards" ( 18 NYCRR 360-4.1). Some resources owned by individuals 65 years of age and older may be disregarded in determining eligibility. One of these exemptions is the equity value of business property that is "income-producing" ( 18 NYCRR 360-4.4 [d] [2] [i]). Our review of the record supports the determination that Kessman's 25% interest in Kessman Golf is not "income-producing" business property as described in 18 NYCRR 360-4.4 (d) (2) (i).

Our review is limited to whether the challenged determination is based on substantial evidence (see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 181-182). Substantial evidence will be found to exist if, upon a review of the record as a whole, we determine that there is a rational basis therein for the findings of fact supporting the agency's determination (see, id.). The court is precluded from weighing the evidence or substituting its own view of the evidence, as that would usurp respondents' function as the fact finder, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, as here (see, Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443-444).

At a fair hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, Kessman testified that he did not receive income from Kessman Golf although he did receive payment of certain contractual obligations owed to him by this family corporation arising out of the sale of a business entity known as the "Kessman Family Partnership". Furthermore, Kessman Golfs accountant affirmed that the fair market value of Kessman's interest in the corporation was $122,169.50 but that, as a minority interest in a closely held corporation, the interest was worthless; The accountant also reported that Kessman Golf operates at a loss, a fact which was also reported by Kessman during his testimony.

In our view, despite a statement in the original application for medical assistance that Kessman received a monthly income of $825 from Kessman Golf and the accountant's assertion that the value of the corporation's stock owned by Kessman is not actually worth the figure he submitted as the fair market value, Kessman's testimony and the accountant's report provided sufficient record evidence to support respondents' determination that Kessman Golf was not "income-producing business property". Thus, it was rational for respondents to determine that the exemption for income-producing property was inapplicable and decedent was therefore ineligible for medical assistance based upon her excess available resources.

Mercure, J. P., Crew III, Peters and Carpinello, JJ., concur.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.


Summaries of

Matter of Kessman v. Ulster Co. Dept., S.S

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Feb 25, 1999
258 A.D.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
Case details for

Matter of Kessman v. Ulster Co. Dept., S.S

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of STEWART G. KESSMAN, as Administrator of the Estate of…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Feb 25, 1999

Citations

258 A.D.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
686 N.Y.S.2d 142

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