Matter of Kellogg

5 Citing cases

  1. Fleet Bank v. Labue

    38 A.D.3d 1235 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 3 times

    We note that, although Elizabeth contends that she was known to Barbara and is known to Barbara's marital children, there is nothing in the record indicating whether the grantor knew Elizabeth or, indeed, whether she was aware that Elizabeth had been born and had been adopted. Also relevant in determining the intent of the grantor is the law in effect when the trust was executed ( see Matter of Vought, 29 AD2d 97, 102, appeal dismissed 21 NY2d 957; Matter of Kellogg, 36 Misc 2d 1064, 1065). The grantor is presumed to have known the law when she executed the trusts ( see generally Cord, 58 NY2d at 545; Leventritt, 92 Misc 2d at 603) and, construing the terms of the trusts pursuant to the law then in effect ( see Domestic Relations Law §§ 117; see generally Matter of Gardiner, 113 AD2d 651, 662, affd 69 NY2d 66), we conclude that the status of Elizabeth as an adopted-out child does not exclude her from the class of Barbara's descendants or children ( cf. Best, 66 NY2d at 154-155).

  2. Matter of Vought

    29 A.D.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967)   Cited 3 times
    In Matter of Vought (29 A.D.2d 97, 104, 285 N.Y.S.2d 780 [1st Dept. 1967]), the First Department applied the principle to trust instruments, holding that when a statute in effect at the time a trust is established legitimatizes a non-marital child, the grantor's use of the term “lawful issue” must be deemed to include a child who falls within that statute.

    Thus it follows that the settlor used the words "lawful issue" in view of the meaning and effect ascribed to them by the then prevailing statutory enactments and decisional law. ( Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, supra, p. 232; Matter of Underhill, supra, p. 739; Matter of Sheffer, 139 Misc. 519, 522; Matter of McKinney, 5 Misc.2d 210, 213; Matter of Kellogg, 36 Misc.2d 1064.) The majority agrees that the settlor "must be considered" to have "used the phrase 'lawful issue' * * * with an awareness of the law as it existed in 1931."

  3. In the Matter of Klosinski

    192 Misc. 2d 714 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002)

    As to the argument that the trust is invalid because it was maintained in a looseleaf binder, whether or not a trust is valid is a question of law (Bankers Trust Co. v Topping, 180 Misc. 596). The validity and construction of an inter vivos trust are determined by the law in effect when the instrument was executed (Matter of Kellogg, 36 Misc.2d 1064). At the time the Trust agreement was executed, New York's imposition of formal requirements on the execution of lifetime trusts had not yet taken effect.

  4. Matter of Klosinski

    192 Misc. 2d 714 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002)

    As to the argument that the trust is invalid because it was maintained in a looseleaf binder, whether or not a trust is valid is a question of law (Bankers Trust Co. v Topping, 180 Misc 596). The validity and construction of an inter vivos trust are determined by the law in effect when the instrument was executed (Matter of Kellogg, 36 Misc 2d 1064). At the time the Trust agreement was executed, New York's imposition of formal requirements on the execution of lifetime trusts had not yet taken effect.

  5. Nat. Cty Bk. of Cleveland v. Ford

    299 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1973)   Cited 1 times

    In view of the Ohio Supreme Court holding in Central Trust Co. v. Bovey (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 187, that the intent of a settlor of an inter vivos trust be determined in light of the law existing at the time of the trust's creation, it seems incontrovertible that the laws of intestacy in effect in Ohio in 1929 will control the definition of "heirs" and the ultimate distribution of the corpus. Accord In re Vought's Trust (1967), 29 App. Div. 2d 97, 285 N. Y. Supp. 2d 780; In re Kellogg's Trust (1962), 36 Misc.2d 1064, 234 N. Y. Supp. 2d 668. The 1929 law of Ohio is in Throckmorton's 1930 Annotated Code of Ohio. General Code Sections 8573, 8574 and 8578 state, inter alia, that realty and personalty devolve first upon the children of the intestate or their legal representatives.