Opinion
December 30, 1970
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered January 27, 1970 in Kings County, which directed appellant to reclassify respondents as Court Clerks II. These appeals were transferred to this Department by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department. This is an article 78 proceeding whereby respondents seek to review and annul a determination of appellant State Administrator classifying respondents as Court Clerks I and directing that they be reclassified as Court Clerks II. An examination of the petition reveals that respondents prior to reclassification under court reorganization on September 1, 1962 were "Court Clerks" in the City Court of the City of New York. They allege that at that time Court Clerk was the highest competitive civil service title in the City Court and they were appointed with unlimited duties. The notice of examination containing the specifications of their duties and responsibilities as Court Clerk is then set forth, along with the title specifications of the reclassified positions of Court Clerk I and Court Clerk II. Respondents next assert that pursuant to a "Table of Conversion" appellant reclassified the duties of some of the Court Clerks of the City Court to the title of Court Clerk II, and by so doing, but reclassifying respondents as Court Clerk I, it arbitrarily and illegally demoted respondents. The "conversion formula" established by appellant, which is referred to in paragraphs 10 and 15 of the petition applies only to court clerks in the Second District Supreme Court and the Supreme Court, Criminal Term in Queens County. (See Matter of Augello v. McCoy, 35 A.D.2d 634.) It is not to be confused with Exhibit A, the "Table of Conversion." Respondents further allege that their duties as Court Clerk were unlimited, due to the New York City Civil Service Commission Resolution of December 30, 1963. Special Term determined, as a matter of law, their "duties" were "unlimited", as demonstrated by the Court Clerk examination notice, the Resolution of 1963 and the New York City Court Act. With this we do not agree. In our opinion, a reading of the examination notice does not permit such a conclusion. Furthermore, by 1963 appellant had validly discontinued the concept of unlimited rights of duties and salaries. (See Matter of Goldstein v. Lang, 23 A.D.2d 483, revd. on dissenting op., 16 N.Y.2d 735.) Turning next to an analysis of the duties of respondents as Court Clerks as set forth in their petition, as compared with those of Court Clerk I and Court Clerk II, we conclude that the record does not contain sufficient proof of the actual duties performed by petitioners to permit a review as to whether there was a proper reclassification by appellant. The allegation in the petition as to their duties is denied. The exhibits add little. The proceeding should be remitted to Special Term in order to develop a more complete record as to the job descriptions of respondents or a survey of the work actually performed by them. (See Matter of Ainsberg v. McCoy, 26 N.Y.2d 56, 61; Matter of McPartland v. McCoy, 35 A.D.2d 641, 642.) Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to Special Term for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Reynolds, J.P., Staley, Jr., Greenblott, Cooke and Sweeney, JJ., concur.