We agree. The People should have been charged with 87 days of postreadiness delay between May 23, 2016, when they "implicitly requested" an adjournment to seek a superseding indictment ( Matter ofJohnson v. Andrews, 179 A.D.2d 417, 418, 579 N.Y.S.2d 332 [1st Dept. 1992] ), and August 18, 2016, when they finally secured a superseding indictment. As both the court and the People acknowledged at various points, that period of delay was "attributable to [the People's] inaction and directly implicate[d] their ability to proceed to trial" on a charge of CPCS in the fifth degree, i.e., the crime that the People sought to add by way of a superseding indictment and the sole crime for which defendant was ultimately convicted ( People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795, 799, 676 N.Y.S.2d 523, 699 N.E.2d 35 [1998] ; see generally CPL 210.05 ; People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 65 n., 556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911 [1990] ).

We disagree and find as a matter of law and common sense that, under the circumstances presented, the alleged victim's wallet was not in the officer's custody within the meaning of Penal Law § 450.10 and thus not subject to the provisions of the statute. However, inasmuch as the court's ruling merely constitutes an error of law and not, as urged by petitioner, an act in excess of the court's powers, the extraordinary remedy of prohibition does not lie and nonreviewability by way of appeal, alone, does not provide a basis for reviewing error by a collateral proceeding in the nature of a writ of prohibition (Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59; Matter of Johnson v. Andrews, 179 A.D.2d 417; see also, People v. Laing, 79 N.Y.2d 166). Accordingly, the petition should be denied and the proceeding dismissed, without costs.

People v. Barkin, 49 N.Y.2d 901, 428 N.Y.S.2d 192, 405 N.E.2d 674 (1980)." (Preiser, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 170.20, at 45; see also Matter of Johnson v Andrews, 179 AD2d 417 [1st Dept 1992].) During the pendency of CPL 170.20 notice, the CPL 30.30 time is chargeable to the People absent any legal reason for exclusion.