Stotts' offer of proof of a neighbor's setback variance for a deck cannot substitute for lack of evidence on the criteria established in the ordinance. See In re Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn.App. 1987). Further, Stotts cannot meet the similarly situated requirement for an equal protection claim because his variance request and his neighbor's variance request are separated in time.
"A person who purchases land with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the zoning restrictions which are in effect at the time of such purchase, is said to have created for himself whatever hardship such restrictions entail." 366 N.W.2d at 627 (quoting 3 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 18.42 (1977)); see also In re Variance Request of Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Minn.App. 1987) (citing Hedlund rule); Castle Design Dev. Co. v. City of Lake Elmo, 396 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn.App. 1986) (same). We went on in Hedlund to hold that knowledge at the time of purchase is by itself a "legally sufficient" ground for denying a variance application.
Otherwise, the granting of one variance would likely result in the destruction of the entire zoning scheme." In re Variance Request of Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn.App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21 (Minn.App. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 581 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1998). Appellants suggest that eight "similarly-situated" properties were treated more favorably; however, all of the situations occurred years before appellants' application.
Id. (citations omitted). The county has broad discretionary power to deny an application for variance. Matter of Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). Since a variance enables a landowner to use property in a manner forbidden by the zoning ordinance, an applicant has a heavy burden to show approval is appropriate.
The Court disagrees. In support of their argument regarding the lapse of the one year time period between the ZBA's granting United Auto Body's application and the denial of the plaintiff's application, the defendants cite a line of Minnesota state law cases beginning with Castle Design Development Co., Inc. v. City of Lake Elmo, 396 N.W.2d 578 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) and In re Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). In Johnson, the Court held that a plaintiff's equal protection claim based on the denial of a variance to build a home where similar applications had been granted in the past will not survive where the earlier applications were granted a year or more earlier.
Stotts v. Wright County, 478 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Minn.App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Feb. 11, 1992); In re Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn.App. 1987) (overruled on other grounds by Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21 (Minn.App. 1997)). Only when applications are considered simultaneously, or when one permit is granted when another is being considered, are permit applicants deemed to be similarly situated.
Otherwise, the granting of one variance would likely result in the destruction of the entire zoning scheme." In re Variance Request of Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn.App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 NW.2d 21 (Minn.App. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 581 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1998); see also Stotts v. Wright County, 478 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Minn.App. 1991) (applying Johnson to affirm district court's rejection of equal-protection challenge to Wright County's allegedly discriminatory denial of an application for a variance to allow construction of a deck), review denied (Minn.
The self-imposed hardship rule provides that if a landowner acquires property the use of which is already restricted the landowner generally cannot claim that the restrictions constitute a taking. In re Johnson, 404 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn.App. 1987); Hedlund v. City of Maplewood, 366 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Minn.App. 1985). In ruling that the zoning classification is not a taking, the district court did not explicitly address the rule.