Opinion
February 20, 1962
Present — Bergan, P.J., Coon, Herlihy Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
Appeal by the employer and its carrier from a decision and award of the Workmen's Compensation Board awarding death benefits and discharging from liability the Special Disability Fund (Workmen's Compensation Law, § 15, subd. 8). Decedent, a diabetic for at least five years prior to his demise, was employed as a counterman. At about 6:30 A.M. on September 26, 1956 decedent cut his finger on a slicing machine. A co-worker who arrived shortly after the accident wrapped the injured finger in a white rag and urged decedent to go to a hospital for treatment. Decedent drove to a nearby hospital arriving at the emergency room at about 7:00 A.M. but it was not until 8:30 A.M. that the injury was treated. The laceration required 10 sutures to close and tetanus antitoxin and penicillin were administered to prevent infection. After being released from the hospital decedent returned to his place of employment but was sent home by his employer. When he arrived home decedent's daughter-in-law observed that decedent was very pale and weak, and decedent told her he had lost a considerable amount of blood. Decedent complained continually to his daughter-in-law that his throbbing finger pained him, and both the daughter-in-law and decedent's wife testified that the dressing became blood soaked to the extent that decedent's wife changed the dressing just prior to retiring. Decedent insisted on going to work the next morning but while in the bathroom he experienced what was later diagnosed as "a mild cerebrovascular accident", and which resulted in a partial paralysis. Decedent was hospitalized and given therapy until his condition was stabilized. On October 27, 1956 decedent suffered convulsive seizures lasting several hours and on November 4, 1956 he died. An autopsy revealed encephalomalacia due to a cerebrovascular accident and myocardial infarction as the cause of death. The board found that the injury to decedent's finger caused a cerebral vascular accident contributing to death and that death was the natural and unavoidable result of the injury. The board further found that decedent's pre-existing diabetic condition was not a causative factor in the injury or death. Appellant first contends that there is no substantial evidence to establish causal relationship between the finger injury and the cerebrovascular accident the next day or between the finger injury and decedent's death. The main thrust of appellant's argument on this point is that there is no evidence that decedent lost a considerable amount of blood as a result of the cut and thus the expert testimony establishing causal relationship between the cut and the stroke which was based on this hypothesis does not constitute substantial evidence. We cannot agree. The nature of the injury, the time between the injury and treatment, decedent's appearance and behavior after the injury, and decedent's statements to his wife, daughter-in-law and Dr. Arce concerning his loss of blood substantiate the fact that decedent suffered a considerable loss of blood. Having reached this conclusion, although there is the usual conflict of medical testimony, we find that the board's determination of causal relationship was based on substantial evidence and thus cannot be disturbed ( Matter of Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463; Matter of Pauson v. Manger Vanderbilt Hotel, 7 A.D.2d 686; Matter of Kelpin v. Watts Sons, 5 A.D.2d 722, motion for leave to appeal denied 4 N.Y.2d 675). Appellant also argues that there is no substantial evidence to support the board's determination discharging the Special Fund from liability. Again there is a conflict of medical testimony as to whether death here would have occurred except for the pre-existing diabetic condition. While some of the medical testimony discloses a possible relationship between diabetes, a pathology with which decedent was known to be afflicted, and the incidence of arteriosclerosis, which was discovered after decedent's death to be a contributing factor in his demise, the present record does not compel a finding that such a relationship existed here, especially since the pre-existing diabetic condition was mild in nature and controlled. Thus we cannot hold that the board's determination that the pre-existing diabetic condition was not a causative factor in decedent's death was not based on substantial evidence ( Matter of Scarangello v. Town of North Hempstead, 3 A.D.2d 874). Decision and award unanimously affirmed, with costs to the Workmen's Compensation Board.