Summary
In Eddy v. The People, 15 Ill. 386, which was an appeal from an order denying a motion for a rehearing filed in a cause wherein Ira B. Eddy had been declared a lunatic.
Summary of this case from Royal Arcanum v. NicholsonOpinion
October 24, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aiello, J.).
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The surety, International Fidelity Insurance Company, posted bail bonds for the criminal defendants in these consolidated appeals. Upon the failure of the defendants to appear in court, their bail was ordered forfeited (CPL 540.10). However, in all of the cases at issue here, the People failed to comply with CPL 540.10 (2) and (3), and neglected to file the orders to obtain judgments within the 60-day period provided by the statute. The People argue that their untimeliness should be excused because the surety did not move to preclude enforcement for more than a year after the judgments were entered.
The People's contention is without merit. The Court of Appeals has made clear in People v. Schonfeld ( 74 N.Y.2d 324), that "under the present statutory scheme [i.e., CPL 540.10], the timely entry of the court's forfeiture order is a necessary prerequisite to the People's ability to recover from the surety" (People v Schonfeld, supra, at 330; see also, People v. Bennett, 136 N.Y. 482). The Legislature's intention, the Court reasoned, "can best be effected if CPL 540.10 (2) is construed to preclude the People's recovery on a bail bond where they fail to proceed against the surety in a timely manner" (People v. Schonfeld, supra, at 329 [emphasis added]). The Schonfeld Court has thus made the People's compliance with the statute's 60-day rule a condition precedent to the recovery of forfeiture judgments. Only the Legislature can amend CPL 540.10 to provide that the People's right to such recovery revives if the surety fails to move within a specified time to vacate a judgment not entered within the 60-day statutory period.
In addition, we conclude that the Supreme Court could have properly vacated the judgments under CPLR 5240, which provides that "[t]he court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person * * * make an order denying * * * the use of any enforcement procedure" (emphasis supplied). Lawrence, J.P., Pizzuto, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.