The crime which respondent was convicted of is a "serious crime" within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) and 22 NYCRR 603.12(b). Further, this Court has repeatedly held that the crime of which respondent has been convicted, wire fraud in violation of 18 USC § 1343, is a "serious crime" within the meaning of the statute (see e.g. Matter of Fasciana, 36 AD3d 9 [1st Dept 2006]); Matter of Klein, 28 AD3d 102 [1st Dept 2006]; Matter of Holtz, 230 AD2d 193 [1st Dept 1997]; Matter of Ballinger, 148 AD2d 152 [1st Dept 1989]); Matter of Caparros, 142 AD2d 122 [1st Dept 1988]). Accordingly, respondent's conviction mandates the conclusion that he has been convicted of a "serious crime."

The fact that respondent did not file the asylum application has no bearing on whether he committed the crime since he was convicted of conspiracy. Indeed, the Second Circuit rejected respondent's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on the fact that he did not file the application because completion of the crime was not essential to the charge ( United States v Christo, 413 Fed Appx 375 [2d Cir 2011], supra) Under all of the circumstances of this case, including both the serious nature of the crime and the mitigating factors discussed above, it is appropriate for this Court to follow its usual policy of suspending individuals who have been convicted of a serious crime for a period coexistent to the period of probation imposed by the federal district court. Only in rare instances do we not follow this policy ( see Matter of Hirschl, 10 AD3d 164; Matter of Holtz, 230 AD2d 193). We do not find reasons to depart from that policy here.

(Judiciary Law § 90 [d]; 22 NYCRR 603.12 [b]). As noted, wire fraud is a felony under the United States Code, and this Court previously has held that a conviction of wire fraud in violation of 18 USC § 1343 constitutes a "serious crime" within the meaning of the statute ( see Matter of Holtz, 230 AD2d 193; Matter of Caparros, 142 AD2d 122). Accordingly, this respondent's conviction of wire fraud mandates the conclusion that he has been convicted of a serious crime.

In support, petitioner has demonstrated that on or about May 20, 1996, respondent pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, a felony under the United States Code, based on allegations that as an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the New York City Parking Violations Bureau, respondent had dismissed or reduced parking summonses for individuals based on documents that he knew to be false. Respondent was subsequently sentenced to two years on probation with four months of home detention, a fine of $5,000 and a special assessment of $50. By order dated March 18, 1997 ( 230 A.D.2d 193), this Court granted a petition for an order determining that the crime of which respondent was convicted was a "serious crime" as defined by Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) and Rules of this Court (22 N.Y.CRR) § 603.12 (b), suspending respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f), and directing respondent, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(g), to show cause before petitioner, which would thereupon hold a hearing and issue a report and recommendation to this Court, why a final order of censure, suspension or disbarment should not be made. That hearing was duly held and respondent himself testified and presented a number of character witnesses.