Notably, contrary to defendant's characterization, the IAS directive did not prohibit the filing of omnibus motions and explicitly reserved the right of either party to submit written motions. Moreover, the directive neither conditioned the submission of pretrial motions on prior judicial approval, a practice which has been uniformly condemned ( see, e.g., Heist v Cameron, 211 A.D.2d 429, 430; Matter of Hochberg v. Davis, 171 A.D.2d 192, 195, amended 179 A.D.2d 372), nor did it shorten the legislatively mandated 45-day time period within which a defendant may submit pretrial motions ( cf., Matter of Veloz v Rothwax, 65 N.Y.2d 902, 903). Furthermore, the record reflects that defendant participated in the suppression hearing without objection and received both discovery materials and a response to his request for a bill of particulars.
The IAS Judge had reviewed the entire history of discovery, noting that disputes between the parties had caused four years to pass with no discovery, made a determination that both sides were dilatory, and ordered discovery cease. Since the IAS Judge was in the best position to discern the most just resolution, his later refusal to reconsider was consistent with the court's inherent power to control its own calendar and the disposition of business before it (see, Matter of Hochberg v Davis, 171 A.D.2d 192, 194, amended 179 A.D.2d 372). Concur — Carro, J.P., Rosenberger, Ellerin and Asch, JJ.
Plaintiffs were precluded from appeal as of right because of the default (CPLR 5511). The trial court erred in conditioning plaintiffs' motion to vacate default on prior judicial approval for making such a motion (Matter of Hochberg v Davis, 171 A.D.2d 192, amended on rearg 179 A.D.2d 372). The court held a hearing and denied the application in a written order (cf., Matter of Grisi v Shainswit, 119 A.D.2d 418), ruling that present counsel had failed to offer any excuse for default or any meritorious defense to the counterclaims.