. Parenthetically, plaintiff's counsel's contention that an attorney fee comparatively large for a modest principal award is appropriate based upon In re Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co. , 179 A.D.2d 645, 578 N.Y.S.2d 593 (2nd Dept. 1992) is misplaced. The appropriateness of an increased attorney's fee in excess of $850 will be determined based upon applicable considerations of a reasonable attorney's fee (seeRMP Capital Corp. v. Victory Jet, LLC , 139 A.D.3d 836, 32 N.Y.S.3d 231 [App. Div. 2016]"the award of attorney's fees, whether pursuant to agreement or statute, must be reasonable and not excessive").

As applicable here, the superintendent's regulations provide that an attorney's fee for services rendered in connection with "a court appeal from a master arbitration award . . . shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter" (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.10[j][4]). The term "court appeal" applies to a proceeding such as this, taken pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 179 AD2d 645).

No "policy issues" were checked off as reasons for denial on the denial of claim form (see petitioner's exhibit B). However, there do not appear to be any no-fault regulations limiting the amount of attorney's fees recoverable for services rendered in a proceeding taken pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see e.g. Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v Natl. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 179 A.D.2d 645, 646 [2d Dept 1992]). In Matter of Hempstead General Hospital, the Appellate Division, Second Department implicitly endorsed the calculation of the attorney's fees upon a reasonable hourly rate without any limitations, for services rendered in a proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, "the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his attorney's reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to [the] limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations." In a proceeding for judicial review of an award by a master arbitrator, an attorney's fee shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-4.10[j][4]; Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. , 179 AD2d 645).

f interest and attorney's fees for which State Farm was responsible to the plaintiffs on the underlying no-fault claims (see, Smithtown Gen. Hosp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 A.D.2d 338). Henig's attempt to recover attorney's fees for his prosecution of the prior appeal is an impermissible attempt to recover a "fee upon a fee" (see, Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 429, 431, affd 64 N.Y.2d 958). Henig's reliance upon 11 NYCRR 65.18 (k) (4) is misplaced. 11 NYCRR 65.18 concerns proceedings involving a master arbitrator and, inter alia, allows a claimant to recover an "attorney's fee for services rendered in connection with a court adjudication of a dispute de novo, as provided in section 5106 (c) of the Insurance Law, or in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals" (11 NYCRR 65.18 [k] [4]). Since this proceeding did not involve an appeal of a master arbitration award, this section is inapplicable here. Henig's reliance upon Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. ( 179 A.D.2d 645) is also misplaced, since in that case the petitioner was awarded attorney's fees in a proceeding which involved a court appeal from a master arbitration award. Mangano, P.J., Thompson, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.

Petitioner also cites to Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. (148 A.D.3d 703 [2d Dept 2017]) as support for its request for an attorney's fee in this special proceeding to confirm the No-Fault master arbitration award. Petitioner emphasizes the following language in said opinion at page 705: "The term 'court appeal' applies to a proceeding such as this, taken pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award (see Matter of Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 179 A.D.2d 645 [1992])" (emphasis added). This Court holds that to the extent the Appellate Division included the words "or confirm" it was dicta because in Matter of GEICO Ins. Co. v AAAMG Leasing Corp. at issue was a petition to vacate a master arbitration award.

In addition, the Court has disallowed the recovery of attorney's fees for work performed by Greenberg. Plaintiff fails to provide support for the proposition that Plaintiff itself may charge attorney's fees because its principal member is an attorney, especially given the fact that Greenberg retained the firm of Kilpatrick Townsend to represent Plaintiff in this matter from the beginning. The Court also, for the most part, did not consider the time spent by Plaintiff's counsel in substantiating its fee (see Hempstead General Hosp. v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. , 179 AD2d 645, 646 [2d Dept 1992] [the Court previously held it improper to award a "fee upon a fee" when the counsel fee award was based on time spent by counsel substantiating his fee] ). In selecting which line items to give credit to (or not to give credit to), the Court has inevitably engaged in a quantum meruit analysis as well.