Opinion
February 26, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Geiler, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
We reject the petitioner's contention that he is entitled to the area variances he seeks as of right because his property was held in single and separate ownership at the time of the enactment of the restrictions from which he seeks relief. Town of Islip Code §§ 68-111, 68-113 and 68-115 expressly provide that the owner of a plot which has been held in single and separate ownership at the time of the passage of the ordinance or any amendment thereto may qualify for only one variance as of right (i.e., either as to area density, total width, or side yard width), since each section requires "compliance with all zoning requirements other than the one for which the single and separate dispensation is conferred" (Matter of Dittmer v Scheyer, 74 A.D.2d 828; see also, Matter of Koster Kuenen, Inc. v Scheyer, 156 A.D.2d 563; Matter of Synder v Scheyer, 153 A.D.2d 630; Matter of Siciliano v Scheyer, 150 A.D.2d 460). Inasmuch as the petitioner sought multiple variances for width, square footage, side yard width and total side yard width, he failed to comply with the aforesaid provisions. Further, as the petitioner purchased his property with the knowledge that pursuant to the provisions of the zoning ordinance a single-family home could not be built on it, he has not met the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the zoning ordinance as applied to him amounts to an unconstitutional taking of his property (cf., Matter of Siciliano v Scheyer, supra).
Moreover, it is well established that in order to obtain area variances as a matter of discretion, a petitioner must establish significant economic hardship or practical difficulty (see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441; Matter of Cowan v Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591; Matter of Koster Keunen, Inc. v Scheyer, 156 A.D.2d 563, supra; Matter of Lakeland Park Estates v Scheyer, 142 A.D.2d 582). Although without the requested variances the subject parcel cannot be developed, the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the purchase price of the parcel was $11,000 and that he could only recoup $5,000 or $6,000 of this investment without the variances, was insufficient to show "significant economic hardship" (Matter of Cowan v Kern, supra, at 596; Matter of Lakeland Park Estates v Scheyer, supra). Indeed, the low purchase price was reflective of the fact that the parcel is substandard. Thus, the petitioner would receive an unjustified windfall if the variances were to be granted (see, Matter of Lakeland Park Estates v Scheyer, supra). Furthermore, the variances sought are substantial and thus more likely to have an adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood, which is in the process of being upgraded through a community renewal program (see, Human Dev. Servs. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 110 A.D.2d 135, 139, affd 67 N.Y.2d 702; Matter of Siciliano v Scheyer, 150 A.D.2d 460, supra; Matter of Townwide Props. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 A.D.2d 757). While not determinative, the fact that the petitioner's hardship was self-created is a significant element militating against the grant of his application (see, Matter of Nammack v Krucklin, 149 A.D.2d 596; see also, Matter of Graziano v Scalafani, 143 A.D.2d 664; Matter of Lakeland Parks Estates v Scheyer, 142 A.D.2d 582, supra). Under these circumstances, the respondent's determination was neither illegal, arbitrary, nor an abuse of discretion (see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, supra, at 444; Matter of Niceforo v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Brown and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.