Here, the order is nonfinal because Supreme Court did not dismiss those parts of the petition that it declined to grant, but rather denied them without prejudice (see Matter of Grosso v Slade, 179 A.D.2d 585, 585-586 [1st Dept 1992]; cf. Matter of Roesch v State of New York, 187 A.D.3d 1651, 1651-1652 [4th Dept 2020]). Contrary to respondent's contention, although a determination that remits a matter for purely ministerial action is appealable as of right (see Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 A.D.3d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2005]), here the court directed respondent to submit petitioner's grant application for a determination by respondent's Board of Directors, not for a" 'purely ministerial'" action (Matter of Mid-Is. Hosp. v Wyman, 15 N.Y.2d 374, 379 [1965]; cf. Valentin, 16 A.D.3d at 146). Although we have the power to treat the notice of appeal as an application for permission to appeal

Neither of the decisions filed on January 12, 2010 constitutes an appealable paper (CPLR 5512 [a]), and this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction ( Matter of Grosso v Slade, 179 AD2d 585, 586). The ruling by Justice Gische was reduced to a short-form order duly entered on January 14, 2009 (CPLR 2219 [a]) but not appealed from.

Neither of the decisions filed on January 12, 2010 constitutes an appealable paper (CPLR 5512[a] ), and this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction ( Matter of Grosso v. Slade, 179 A.D.2d 585, 586, 580 N.Y.S.2d 648 [1992] ). The ruling by Justice Gische was reduced to a short-form order duly entered on January 14, 2009 (CPLR 2219[a] ) but not appealed from.

Plaintiff has purported to appeal from the court's trial ruling dismissing his breach of partnership claim on the grounds that he had failed to show the existence of a partnership. Though defendant has not raised this objection, under CPLR 5512 (a) no appeal can be taken from this ruling because it was never incorporated into an appealable order, nor has it been subsumed in a final judgment ( Matter of Grosso v. Slade, 179 A.D.2d 585, 586). The procedural posture of the instant case is very similar to that presented in Stevens v. Naumburg ( 214 App. Div. 94).

The ruling which respondent would have us review is contained in an unsigned, unentered transcript of the March 1, 1990 proceedings, and, as such, is nonappealable (CPLR 5512 [a]; 2219 [b]; Matter of Grosso v. Slade, 179 A.D.2d 585; Matter of Grisi v. Shainswit, 119 A.D.2d 418, 420). In any event, on the merits, respondent failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense to the abandonment proceeding (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Celeste M., 180 A.D.2d 437), that she could have been served by a method other than publication (Family Ct Act § 617 [b]), or that her attorney was ineffective.

For these reasons, we find that the order petitioners are seeking to appeal from is an intermediate order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Accordingly, we shall dismiss this appeal (see, Matter of Grosso v. Slade, 179 A.D.2d 585). Mikoll, J.P., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur.

No appeal lies as of right from a nonfinal order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see CPLR 5701 [b] [1]; Matter of Green v Monroe County Child Support Enforcement Unit, 111 A.D.3d 1446, 1447 [4th Dept 2013]). Here, the order is nonfinal because Supreme Court did not dismiss those parts of the petition that it declined to grant, but rather denied them without prejudice (see Matter of Grosso v Slade, 179 A.D.2d 585, 585-586 [1st Dept 1992]; cf. Matter of Roesch v State of New York, 187 A.D.3d 1651, 1651-1652 [4th Dept 2020]). Contrary to respondent's contention, although a determination that remits a matter for purely ministerial action is appealable as of right (see Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 A.D.3d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2005]), here the court directed respondent to submit petitioner's grant application for a determination by respondent's Board of Directors, not for a" 'purely ministerial'" action (Matter of Mid-Is.