Moreover, the importance of an alternative remedy has been recognized in several decisions refusing to quash a subpoena despite allegations that it was being used by the prosecutor to collect evidence for a civil proceeding on the ground that disclosure could be prevented under Rule 6(e) or cured by suppression of the evidence in later civil proceedings. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, supra; In re Special March 1974 Grand Jury, 541 F.2d 166, 170-71 (7 Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 520 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.Tex. 1981). Here the alleged abuse of the grand jury process is an apparent effort by the United States Attorney to coerce a plea bargain from a relative of the witness by threatening the witness with imprisonment for contempt if he refuses to testify against his relatives, something he has expressed great reluctance to do. If the resulting plea is truly coerced, it cannot properly be accepted under Rule 11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, at the Rule 11 proceeding, it would be incumbent upon the district court to ascertain the nature of the plea discussions held between the defendant, his counsel and the United States Attorney. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee note, 1974 amendment. If the district court determined that improper persuasion had been used by the prosecutor to compel the plea, the district court could not accept it, or if the issue was raised later, collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would be available.

Thus, this Court finds premature and speculative MERCERON'S claim that the subpoena should be quashed because Stroock subpoenaed his bank records with the intent to locate assets in the United States that will be subject to civil actions. Again, MERCERON may raise these objections if and when someone does institute such litigation. See e.g., Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 520 F. Supp. 253, 255 (S.D.Tex. 1981) (objection based on possible use of subpoena should be raised only if and when a civil suit is brought); and U.S. v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d 347, 351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 978, 104 S.Ct. 1019, 78 L.Ed.2d 354 (1983) (a court will generally refuse to quash a subpoena when motion to suppress may be raised in a potential later civil proceeding). 4.