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Goldstein v. Clarkstown Central School District

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Oct 3, 1994
208 A.D.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

Opinion

October 3, 1994

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Stolarik, J.).


Ordered that the order is reversed, as a matter of discretion, with costs, and the application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is denied.

Given that the petitioner failed to adequately establish a reasonable excuse for her approximately four-year delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Perry v. City of New York, 133 A.D.2d 692; Fox v. City of New York, 91 A.D.2d 624), that the Clarkstown Central School District did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time of the claim's accrual (see, Matter of Bloom v Herrick Union Free School Dist., 174 A.D.2d 665; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., 131 A.D.2d 574), and that the Clarkstown Central School District was potentially prejudiced as a result of the petitioner's extensive delay (see, Matter of Perry v. City of New York, supra; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., supra; see also, Matter of Lucy L. v. County of Westchester, 149 A.D.2d 707), the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the petitioner's application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Pavone v. City of New York, 170 A.D.2d 493).

Moreover, while the petitioner was an infant when the claim arose, and filed the notice of claim within 90 days of having attained the age of majority, "[t]he incorporation of the [infancy] toll [of CPLR 208] into the period of limitations specified in section 50-e (subd 5) merely confers upon the courts the authority to entertain the otherwise untimely applications of disabled claimants; it does not, however, dictate that such applications automatically be granted" (Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256, 266).

In any event, the infancy of the petitioner is of little consequence where, as here, she has failed to establish a nexus between her infancy and her delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Kyser v. New York City Hous. Auth., 178 A.D.2d 601; Matter of Gandia v. New York City Hous. Auth., 173 A.D.2d 824). Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Pizzuto and Friedmann, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Goldstein v. Clarkstown Central School District

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Oct 3, 1994
208 A.D.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
Case details for

Goldstein v. Clarkstown Central School District

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of CARRIE GOLDSTEIN, Respondent, v. CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Oct 3, 1994

Citations

208 A.D.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
616 N.Y.S.2d 1010

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