With respect to the father's use of the child as a pawn against the mother, the mother testified that she commenced the present proceeding when the father refused her visitation unless she came to a financial agreement with him. Although the father denied that he did such a thing, the Family Court, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, chose to credit the mother's testimony and to discredit the testimony of the father, whom the court found was "smug, hostile and evasive during his testimony." A denial of visitation, standing alone, may be a ground for a change of custody (see, Matter of Gloria S. v Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72), and the father's move to Lake Ronkonkoma did not serve to facilitate the mother's exercise of her visitation rights (see, Matter of Radford v Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93; Rybicki v Rybicki, 176 A.D.2d 867). Moreover, using visitation as a quid pro quo for a financial settlement is particularly reprehensible. During the present proceeding, the father claimed that the mother's fiance sexually abused the child.

Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1) provides, in pertinent part, that the trial court's award of custody must be made as justice requires, "having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child", noting that "[i]n all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent." However, while "due deference must be accorded to the trial court, which has seen and evaluated the evidence first hand * * * [a]n appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a Trial Judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lack[ed] a sound and substantial basis in the record and, indeed, [was] contrary to the weight of the credible evidence" (Matter of Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76). Upon our own authority to make a determination on the record before us, we conclude that the weight of the credible evidence supports an award of custody to the wife.

The overriding concern where custody is in issue must necessarily be the best interests of the child ( see, Domestic Relations Law §§ 70, 240; Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543; Matter of Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76). Absent specific behavior on the part of plaintiff which the court deemed to be in conflict with the children's social, emotional or moral welfare, it was error to have ordered plaintiff to submit to an additional examination by a psychiatrist designated by defendant.

( Matter of Darlene T., 28 N.Y.2d 391, 395; Giraldo v Giraldo, 85 A.D.2d 164, 171.) Indeed "[a]n appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a Trial Judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record and, indeed, is contrary to the weight of the credible evidence (cf. Matter of Darlene T., 28 N.Y.2d 391, 395)" ( Matter of Gloria S. v Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76). Although there are no absolutes in the law governing custody of children ( Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, supra), there are factors that are entitled to weighty consideration.

Because the Family Court's determination is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Guiracocha v Amaro, 122 AD3d 632; Matter of Dobbins v Vartabedian, 304 AD2d 665; Matter of Coakley v Goins, 240 AD2d 573). However, an appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a trial court judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacks a sounds and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Guiracocha v Amaro, 122 AD3d 632; Matter of Shannon J. v Aaron P., 111 AD3d 829; Matter of Grisanti v Grisanti, 4 AD3d 471; Matter of Gloria S. v Richard B., 80 AD2d 72). In an initial determination of residential custody, the relevant issue is whether it is in the best interests of the child to reside primarily with the mother or the father (see generally Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 172-174).

bility of the witnesses and of the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, its findings are generally accorded great respect and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record, or are contrary to the weight of the evidence" ( Trinagel v. Boyar, 70 A.D.3d 816, 893 N.Y.S.2d 636 ; see Matter of Selliah v. Penamente, 107 A.D.3d 1004, 1004, 968 N.Y.S.2d 177 ; Matter of Jackson v. Coleman, 94 A.D.3d 762, 763, 941 N.Y.S.2d 273 ). Nonetheless, this Court's authority in custody and visitation matters is as broad as that of the hearing court, "and while we are mindful that the hearing court has an advantage in being able to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of witnesses, we ‘would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a Trial Judge,’ we allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Caruso v. Cruz, 114 A.D.3d 769, 772, 980 N.Y.S.2d 137, quoting Matter of Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76, 437 N.Y.S.2d 411 ; see Matter of James A.—S. v. Cassandra A.—S., 107 A.D.3d 703, 706, 967 N.Y.S.2d 99 ; Matter of Moran v. Cortez, 85 A.D.3d 795, 796–797, 925 N.Y.S.2d 539 ).Here, both parties contend that there has been a change in circumstances warranting modification of the stipulation of settlement.

ermination is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 N.Y.2d 946, 488 N.Y.S.2d 637, 477 N.E.2d 1091 ; Matter of Guiracocha v. Amaro, 122 A.D.3d 632, 633, 996 N.Y.S.2d 108 ; Matter of Dobbins v. Vartabedian, 304 A.D.2d 665, 666, 758 N.Y.S.2d 153 ; Matter of Coakley v. Goins, 240 A.D.2d 573, 659 N.Y.S.2d 75 ). However, an appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a trial court judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Guiracocha v. Amaro, 122 A.D.3d at 633, 996 N.Y.S.2d 108 ; Matter of Shannon J. v. Aaron P., 111 A.D.3d 829, 830, 975 N.Y.S.2d 152 ; Matter of Grisanti v. Grisanti, 4 A.D.3d 471, 474, 772 N.Y.S.2d 700 ; Matter of Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 437 N.Y.S.2d 411 ). In this case, the Family Court's determination awarding the father sole legal and residential custody of the child does not have a sound and substantial basis in the record.

“In custody matters, the credibility determinations of the Family Court are entitled to deference, as the Family Court was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses” ( Matter of Cortez v. Cortez, 111 A.D.3d at 717, 974 N.Y.S.2d 791; see Matter of Laura C. [Eduardo C.], 108 A.D.3d 666, 969 N.Y.S.2d 164; Matter of Pietrafesa v. Pietrafesa, 108 A.D.3d 557, 970 N.Y.S.2d 38). However, the authority of an appellate court is as broad as that of the Family Court ( see Matter of Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 N.Y.2d 946, 947, 488 N.Y.S.2d 637, 477 N.E.2d 1091; Matter of Ellis v. Burke, 108 A.D.3d 764, 970 N.Y.S.2d 251; Matter of Edwards v. Rothschild, 60 A.D.3d 675, 875 N.Y.S.2d 155), and “[a]n appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a Trial Judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lack[ed] a sound and substantial basis in the record” ( Matter of Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76, 437 N.Y.S.2d 411; see Matter of Cortez v. Cortez, 111 A.D.3d at 717, 974 N.Y.S.2d 791; Matter of Iams v. Estate of Iams, 106 A.D.3d 910, 965 N.Y.S.2d 165; Matter of Moran v. Cortez, 85 A.D.3d 795, 797, 925 N.Y.S.2d 539; Matter of Ruggiero v. Noe, 77 A.D.3d 959, 961, 910 N.Y.S.2d 479). In adjudicating the mother's petition and the father's cross petition for sole custody, the Family Court was required to determine whether the parents' interaction was so acrimonious that it effectively precluded them from joint decision-making ( see Matter of Arndt v. Arndt, 100 A.D.3d 879, 880, 954 N.Y.S.2d 196; Matter of Schweizer v. Jablesnik, 95 A.D.3d 1341, 944 N.Y.S.2d 891), and if so, to award sole custody to whichever parent serves the best interests of the children ( see Angelova v. Ruchinsky, 126 A.D.3d 828, 829, 6 N.Y.S.3d 97).

Since the Family Court's custody determination is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Louise E.S. v W. Stephen S., 64 NY2d 946; Matter of Dobbins v Vartabedian, 304 AD2d 665, 666; Coakley v Goins, 240 AD2d 573; Coyne v Coyne, 150 AD2d 573; Skolnick v Skolnick, 142 AD2d 570). However, an appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a trial judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Shannon J. v Aaron P., 111 AD3d 829, 830; Matter of Grisanti v Grisanti, 4 AD3d 471, 474; Matter of Gloria S. v Richard B., 80 AD2d 72, 76). In this case, the Family Court's determination awarding the father sole legal and physical custody of the child does not have a sound and substantial basis in the record.

Since the Family Court's custody determination is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Louise E.S. v. W. Stephen S., 64 N.Y.2d 946, 488 N.Y.S.2d 637, 477 N.E.2d 1091; Matter of Dobbins v. Vartabedian, 304 A.D.2d 665, 666, 758 N.Y.S.2d 153; Coakley v. Goins, 240 A.D.2d 573, 659 N.Y.S.2d 75; Coyne v. Coyne, 150 A.D.2d 573, 541 N.Y.S.2d 448; Skolnick v. Skolnick, 142 A.D.2d 570, 530 N.Y.S.2d 235). However, an appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a trial judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Shannon J. v. Aaron P., 111 A.D.3d 829, 830, 975 N.Y.S.2d 152; Matter of Grisanti v. Grisanti, 4 A.D.3d 471, 474, 772 N.Y.S.2d 700; Matter of Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76, 437 N.Y.S.2d 411). In this case, the Family Court's determination awarding the father sole legal and physical custody of the child does not have a sound and substantial basis in the record.