Opinion
January 11, 1993
Appeal from the Family Court, Putnam County (Sweeny, J.).
Ordered that on the court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the order dated February 1, 1990, is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701 [b] [1]); and it is further,
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with costs.
While no appeal lies as of right from a sua sponte order which does not determine a motion made on notice (see, CPLR 5701 [a] [2] [c]; Kokalari v. Kokalari, 166 A.D.2d 418), the notice of appeal from the order dated February 1, 1990, has been treated as an application for leave to appeal and leave has been granted.
The respective appellants, attorneys who performed certain legal work in connection with this private placement adoption proceeding, contend that the Family Court committed error in reducing their counsel fees. We disagree.
It is well settled that the courts possess the authority to supervise the charging of legal fees as part of their power to regulate the practice of law (see, Matter of First Natl. Bank v Brower, 42 N.Y.2d 471; Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97; Matter of Male Infant B., 96 A.D.2d 1055). Based upon our review of the documentary evidence of the legal services rendered, the results achieved in this proceeding, the standing of counsel, and the customary fees charged in the legal community for comparable services, we find that the Family Court's determination with respect to the fees in this proceeding did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see, Matter of Lanyi, 147 A.D.2d 644; see generally, Matter of Schmidt, 134 A.D.2d 432; Matter of Potts, 213 App. Div. 59, affd 241 N.Y. 593). Sullivan, J.P., Lawrence, Miller and O'Brien, JJ., concur.