Opinion
April 27, 1992
Adjudged that the petition is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
"Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court — in cases where judicial authority is challenged — acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers" (Matter of Holtzman v Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 569; Matter of Crain Communications v Hughes, 74 N.Y.2d 626, 627-628). Prohibition is never available "merely to correct or prevent trial errors of substantive law or procedure, however grievous" (La Rocca v Love, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 579, cert denied 424 U.S. 968), nor is it available in cases where an adequate remedy exists, whether by way of appeal or otherwise (see, Matter of Molea v Marasco, 64 N.Y.2d 718, 720). Similarly, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial act, and only when there exists a clear legal right to the relief sought (see, Matter of Legal Aid Socy. v Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12, 16). The petitioner here has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to either of these remedies which could not be safeguarded through alternative remedies (see, Matter of Lipari v Owens, 70 N.Y.2d 731; Matter of Rush v Mordue, 68 N.Y.2d 348, 353; Matter of Molea v Marasco, supra). Accordingly, the proceeding must be dismissed. Mangano, P.J., Thompson, Bracken, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.