Opinion
July 8, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O'Brien, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
An unidentified vehicle allegedly cut off a police car, causing the police car to strike the appellant's car, propelling it into an unoccupied, parked vehicle. The appellant allegedly suffered injuries in the accident and made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits with her insurance carrier, the petitioner Federal Insurance Company, a member of the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies (hereinafter Chubb). Chubb then commenced the instant proceeding to stay arbitration, asserting that the appellant was not entitled to arbitration of her claim because, inter alia, there had been no "physical contact" with the unidentified vehicle. The Supreme Court granted the petition on this basis, and we affirm.
It is well settled that pursuant to Insurance Law § 5217, "[p]hysical contact is a condition precedent to an arbitration that is based on a so-called hit-and-run accident" ( Matter of Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 222 A.D.2d 581). Although direct contact with the unidentified vehicle is not necessary to satisfy the term "`physical contact'" ( Matter of Smith [Great Am. Ins. Co.], 29 N.Y.2d 116, 118; MVAIC v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1), in the instant case the court properly granted the petition and stayed arbitration of the appellant's claim because the underlying accident did not originate "in collision with an unidentified vehicle, or an integral part of an unidentified vehicle" ( Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Killakey, 78 N.Y.2d 325, 329; see, Matter of Smith [Great Am. Ins. Co.], supra, at 119-120). Bracken, J.P., Miller, Joy, Hart and Krausman, JJ., concur.