In re Faith GG

17 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Yolanda D

    88 N.Y.2d 790 (N.Y. 1996)   Cited 184 times
    Discussing N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act ยง 1012

    Thus, the common thread running through the various categories of persons legally responsible for a child's care is that these persons serve as the functional equivalent of parents. Various courts have focused on whether an alleged respondent stands in loco parentis or acts as the functional equivalent of a parent in a household or "family" setting when determining whether that person is legally responsible for the child's care ( see, e.g., Matter of Anthony YY. [Margaret ZZ.], 202 A.D.2d 740, 741; Matter of Jessica QQ. [Dawn RR.], 200 A.D.2d 887; Matter of Faith G.G. [Terry H.H.], 179 A.D.2d 901, appeal denied 80 N.Y.2d 752; Matter of Commissioner of SocialServs. [R./S. Children], 168 Misc.2d 11; Matter of Jessica C., 132 Misc.2d 596, 600). Although the analysis required by both approaches appears similar, whether a person stands in loco parentis to a child is a separate inquiry from whether such a person acts as the functional equivalent of a parent. A person acting in loco parentis intends to assume the responsibility to support and care for the child on a permanent basis ( Johnson v Jamaica Hosp., 62 N.Y.2d 523, 529).

  2. Matter of Faith G.G

    80 N.Y.2d 752 (N.Y. 1992)

    Decided July 1, 1992 Appeal from (3d Dept: 179 A.D.2d 901) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED

  3. In re Elijah AA.

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 2812 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

    Respondent, however, makes a compelling argument to the contrary. He notes that his paternity was not established until after the neglect proceeding was commenced and that his mere actions of taking Jacquelynne BB. to prenatal appointments or the store prior to the child's birth do not show that he was "the functional equivalent of a parent in a household setting" (Matter of Faith GG., 179 A.D.2d 901, 901 [3d Dept 1992], lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 752 [1992]).

  4. Otsego Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Alexander AA. (In re Elijah AA.)

    216 A.D.3d 1372 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

    Respondent, however, makes a compelling argument to the contrary. He notes that his paternity was not established until after the neglect proceeding was commenced and that his mere actions of taking Jacquelynne BB. to prenatal appointments or the store prior to the child's birth do not show that he was "the functional equivalent of a parent in a household setting" ( Matter of Faith GG., 179 A.D.2d 901, 901, 578 N.Y.S.2d 705 [3d Dept. 1992], lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 752, 587 N.Y.S.2d 904, 600 N.E.2d 631 [1992] ). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in my view, it is unnecessary to resolve at this time the issue of whether respondent was a person legally responsible for the child.

  5. In re Shaun

    55 A.D.3d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    The court erred in finding respondent legally responsible for the care of her boyfriend's child, Kyla ( see Family Ct Act ยง 1012 [a]), who had made only sporadic visits to the apartment shared by respondent and her boyfriend. The child was never left in respondent's sole care and was at all times in the care of her father, including when the abuse took place, at which time respondent was sleeping ( see Matter of R./C. Children, 303 AD2d 172; Matter of Faith GG., 179 AD2d 901, lv denied 80 NY2d 752). Moreover, there was no evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing from which it reasonably could be concluded that respondent had any reason whatsoever to apprehend that her boyfriend might injure Kyla, let alone that he might injure her by shaking her ( see Matter of P. Children, 272 AD2d 211, 211-212, lv denied 95 NY2d 770 [evidence insufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect against father, where mother lost her temper and struck her son, because "(t)here was no showing that (father) had prior reason to know that the child was in danger"]).

  6. In the Matter of Devina S

    24 A.D.3d 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 2 times

    Respondent's abuse of the subject children was established by proof demonstrating that he murdered the children's mother in the children's home while they were present ( see Matter of Jayvon L., 18 AD3d 292). Respondent's contention that the abuse finding is not sustainable respecting the children not biologically related to him because he was not a person legally responsible for their care is without merit. The proof, including transcripts of respondent's testimony from the trial at which he was convicted of the murder of the children's mother, established, as a matter of law, that respondent was, in fact, a person legally responsible for the children's care ( see Matter of Faith GG., 179 AD2d 901, lv denied 80 NY2d 752). We have considered respondent's remaining argument challenging the court's conditional denial of visitation with Devina S., and find it meritless.

  7. In re Marta B

    233 A.D.2d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 4 times

    Respondent also claims that as a step-grandfather, he is not a person legally responsible for the children's care who is subject to an abuse and/or neglect proceeding ( see, Family Ct Act ยง 1012 [a], [g]). "`Person legally responsible' includes the child's custodian, guardian [or] any other person responsible for the child's care at the relevant time" (Family Ct Act ยง 1012 [g]). The statutory language encompasses "those persons acting in loco parent is or as the functional equivalent of a parent in a household setting" ( Matter of Faith GG., 179 AD2d 901, lv denied 80 NY2d 752). There is undisputed evidence in the record that the children frequently visited respondent and his wife in their home and often spent two or three nights. It is clear that during the visits, respondent and his wife acted as the functional equivalent of parents, cooking and caring for the children.

  8. In re Austin JJ.

    232 A.D.2d 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 10 times
    In Austin, respondent, maternal grandmother, lived in the same home with the subject child, his biological mother, and boyfriend.

    In accordance with the terms of the statute, a "custodian" may include "any person continually or at regular intervals found in the same household as the child when the conduct of such person causes or contributes to the abuse or neglect of the child" ( ibid.). In this regard, "[a]lthough the statutory language broadly refers to `any person', it has been narrowly interpreted to encompass those persons acting in loco parentis or as the functional equivalent of a parent in a household setting" ( Matter of Faith GG., 179 AD2d 901, lv denied 80 NY2d 752). Although there is no dispute that Austin, his mother, her boyfriend and respondent all lived together, the mere fact that respondent was a regular member of Austin's household, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that respondent acted in loco parentis or as the functional equivalent of a parent ( see, Matter of Anthony YY., 202 AD2d 740, 741; Matter of Jessica QQ., 200 AD2d 887).

  9. In re Yolanda D.

    218 A.D.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 5 times

    Since the appellant was not part of the child's household, jurisdiction could only be acquired over him if he was "responsible for the child's care at the relevant time". A person is legally responsible for the child's care at the relevant time when he or she is acting in loco parentis (see, Matter of Anthony YY., 202 A.D.2d 740; Matter of Faith GG., 179 A.D.2d 901; Matter of Jessica C., 132 Misc.2d 596; Matter of Yvette R., 61 Misc.2d 20, 22; Matter of Children, 76 Misc.2d 987; Matter of Maynard v. Shanker, 59 Misc.2d 55). A person acts in loco parentis when he or she intends to assume all the obligations of parenthood (see, Hadden v. Kero-Sun, Inc., 197 A.D.2d 668, 669; People v. Lilly, 71 A.D.2d 393; Rutkowski v. Wasko, 286 App. Div. 327; Matter of Jamal B., 119 Misc.2d 808, 810-811). The Court of Appeals held in Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp. ( 62 N.Y.2d 523, 529), that the status of loco parentis "requires more than mere temporary care and custody; an intent to support and care for the child on a permanent basis must be shown".

  10. Matter of Anthony

    202 A.D.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 23 times

    Petitioner first contends that Family Court erred when it found that the great-grandmother was not a person legally responsible pursuant to Family Court Act ยง 1012 (g). We disagree. That section encompasses "persons acting in loco parentis or as the functional equivalent of a parent in a household setting" (Matter of Faith GG., 179 A.D.2d 901, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 752). It is undisputed that the great-grandmother was a regular member of the child's household. There is, however, insufficient evidence in this record that she acted in loco parentis or was the functional equivalent of a parent.