While "SEQRA review may not serve as a vehicle for adjudicating legal issues concerning compliance with local government zoning," Weok Broad. Corp., 79 N.Y.2d at 382 (internal quotations omitted), and the Planning Board may not "disapprove a [permitted] use under the guise of denying site plan approval," Mialto Realty, Inc. v. Town of Patterson, 491 N.Y.S.2d 825, 825 (2d Dep't 1985) the Board is still vested with considerable discretion in deciding whether to approve or reject a proposed project. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Gallelli, 597 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139 (2d Dep't 1993); Orchards Assocs. v. Planning Bd. of N. Salem, 494 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (2d Dep't 1985). Sprint therefore does not have an absolute right to construct its towers simply because their construction constitutes a permitted use.
Those areas were neither roofed nor intended for shelter and thus do not constitute buildings within the meaning of the Zoning Law ( see § 130-5 [B]; see generally Southside Academy Charter School, 32 AD3d at 1296). In addition, respondent's denial of the site plan application on the ground that those areas would create an appearance inconsistent with the surrounding area was irrational inasmuch as the landscaping incorporated in the site plan screens the alleged objectionable features from public view ( see generally Matter of Exxon Corp. v Gallelli, 192 AD2d 706). To the extent that respondent's denial of the site plan application was based on the ground that the proposed store was a nonconforming use under the Zoning Law, we note that respondent was bound by the use variance previously granted by the Town of Erwin Zoning Board for the construction of the store ( see Matter of Gershowitz v Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhauen, 52 NY2d 763, 765; Matter of Jamil v Village of Scarsdale Planning Bd., 24 AD3d 552, 554).
The Town Board was authorized by both state statute and local law to consider the acoustic, visual, and otherwise aesthetic impact of the proposed land use on adjoining residential lands. Thus, the conditional approval did not constitute an exercise of power outside the scope of the Town Board's jurisdiction ( see Town Law § 274-a [a]; 1980 Town of Greenburgh Zoning Ordinance §§ 285-54 [D], [K]; Matter of Exxon Corp. v Gallelli, 192 AD2d 706, 706-707; Matter of Dodson v Planning Bd. of Town of Highlands, 163 AD2d 804, 805-806; cf. Moriarty v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sloatsburg, 119 AD2d 188), and the Supreme Court properly dismissed the proceeding, as Hampshire's petition was not timely under Town Law § 274-a ( see Matter of Elliot v Boycott, 293 AD2d 676, 676-677; Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy. v Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhaven, 247 AD2d 395, 395-396).