Opinion
No. 98 Mont. 395
February 22, 1999
CERTIFICATION OF EXTRADITABILITY AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT
The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany has requested the extradition of Jurgen Leitmann pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany of June 20, 1978 and the Supplemental Extradition Treaty of October 21, 1986, which entered into force on March 11, 1993. Mr. Leitmann—a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany—was tried and convicted of narcotics violations by a duly constituted court of the Federal Republic of Germany and sentenced, on November 12, 1992, to a term of imprisonment of five years, minus 249 days he had served in custody while awaiting trial. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Leitmann fled the Federal Republic of Germany.
Acting on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Scott R. Lassar, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, filed formal papers in support of the request for extradition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184 on November 25, 1998. Mr. Leitmann was arrested in Chicago, Illinois on December 1, 1998. Following two continuances, this Court conducted a hearing on February 3, 1999, to determine whether the evidence of criminality presented by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is "sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention." 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
Early Supreme Court authority establishes the following elements of extraditability:
(1) Authority in the judicial officer to conduct extradition proceedings;
(2) Jurisdiction of the court over the fugitive;
(3) An extradition treaty in full force and effect;
(4) A showing that the crimes for which surrender is requested are covered by the treaty; and
(5) Competent legal evidence to support the decision.
See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 508 (1896); McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520 (1913); accord Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 512-13 (1916); see also Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1984).
Under a more recent formulation, the elements of a finding of extraditability were stated as follows:
(1) That there are criminal charges pending in the requesting country;
(2) That the charges are included under the treaty as extraditable offenses;
(3) That the individual appearing before the Court is the individual being sought by the requesting country; and
(4) That there is probable cause to believe that the crime was committed and that the person before the court committed it.United States v. Barr, 619 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
The following findings are based upon evidence presented to the Court and materials submitted to the Court by the Assistant United States Attorney.
1. Authority of the Judicial Officer
The extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, authorizes a broad class of judicial officers to hear extradition cases. Federal magistrate judges are expressly authorized by the statute to hear and decide extradition cases, if "authorized so to do by a court of the United States." The local rules for this district court specifically authorize the magistrate judge to "[i]ssue a warrant for the arrest of a fugitive from a foreign country and conduct all necessary hearings under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention." (N.D. Ill. Rule 1.70(B)(1)(j).) In Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit specifically rejected a constitutional challenge to the extradition statute and a local rule which expressly authorized magistrate judges to preside over international extradition proceedings.
This Court has authority to conduct extradition proceedings.
2. Jurisdiction Over the Fugitive
This Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Leitmann on November 25, 1998. Mr. Leitmann was arrested in this district and brought before this Court for an initial appearance on December 1, 1998. Mr. Leitmann is before this Court and has not contested this Court's personal jurisdiction over him.
This Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Leitmann.
3. Treaty in Full Force and Effect
United States law limits extradition to cases in which a treaty is in force between the requesting country and the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181; Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259, 260 (6th Cir. 1957). Although the State Department's opinion in this regard is not controlling, Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1977), it is entitled to considerable deference. Argento, 241 F.2d 263; Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 1969).
The United States has submitted the declaration of Jennifer A. Gergen, Attorney Adviser for the Office of Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Office of the Legal Advisor for the State Department in Washington, D.C., dated January 21, 1999. Ms. Gergen's declaration, which bears the signature of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the seal of the Department of State, asserts that the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, as supplemented, entered into force on March 11, 1993. (TIAS 9785.) Her declaration also states that the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted a diplomatic note dated January 11, 1999, formally requesting the extradition of Mr. Leitmann. Copies of both treaties and the diplomatic note are attached to Ms. Gergen's declaration. Ms. Gergen asserts that the offense for which Mr. Leitmann's extradition is sought is an extraditable offense pursuant to Article 2(1) of the 1978 Extradition Treaty, as amended by the Supplemental Treaty. Finally, Ms. Gergen asserts that documents submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the extradition request were certified on January 11, 1999 by Edward H. Wilkinson, Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs at the United States Embassy in Bonn, who, at the time of the certification, was the principal consular officer of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany.
An extradition treaty is in force and effect between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.
4. Crime Covered by the Treaty
Article 2 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany defines extraditable offenses as follows:
Offenses described in the Appendix to this Treaty which are punishable under the laws of both contracting parties.
Included among the offenses listed in the Appendix are:
(29) Offenses against the laws relating to narcotic drugs . . . cocaine and its derivatives, and other dangerous drugs and chemicals.
Article 2 provides further that:
Extradition shall be granted in respect of an extraditable offense . . . for the enforcement of a penalty or a detention order, if the duration of the penalty or detention order still to be served, or when, in the aggregate, several such penalties or detention orders still to be served, amount to at least six months.
Article 2 of the Treaty provides, further, that extradition shall be granted for attempts to commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, a crime identified in the Appendix. The Treaty recognizes that extradition may be granted whether or not the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States categorize or denominate the offense conduct in the same way. Finally, the Treaty explains that extradition may be granted even where there would be no federal court jurisdiction over the crime in the United States without a showing of use of the mails or means of interstate communication.
Under these provisions, dual criminality is a requirement for extradition; that is, this court is required to examine the facts and decide whether the fugitive's conduct would have violated criminal laws of the United States. The Supreme Court has observed that, consistent with the Treaty provisions noted above, the charged offense(s) need not have the same name or degree of criminality in order for the dual criminality test to be satisfied:
The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be co-extensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922). Accord, Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1984); Cucuzzella v. Keliikoa, 638 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1981). An extradition treaty is to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of bringing fugitives to trial for the alleged offenses, Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 14 (1936); Factor v. Laukenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 301-03 (1933). Consistent with this principle, the court is expected to exercise a presumption in favor of a finding that the offense falls within the treaty, see McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F. Supp. 42, 48 (S.D. Fla. 1981), giving substantial weight to statements by the Secretary of State concerning treaty interpretation.
In support of his assertion that the requirement of dual criminality is met in this case, the United States Attorney has submitted documents prepared by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany and addressed to the United States Department of State. These materials include a one-page request for Extradition. The Request is supported by copies of the applicable Treaties; the 42-page November 12, 1992 judgment of the Tubingen Regional Court, which details the charges and exhaustively reviews the course of the trial and the evidence presented against Mr. Leitmann and two alleged co-conspirators, concluding with a finding of guilt and pronouncement of a sentence; a three-page confirmation of the final judgment prepared by the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Tubingen; and a fugitive arrest warrant for Mr. Leitmann signed by the Tubingen Administrator of Justice.
As set forth in the judgment, Mr. Leitmann has been convicted of and sentenced on charges of intentional illegal dealing with narcotics (cocaine), in violation of Section 29, sub-section 1, sub-sub-section 1, sub-section 3, sub-sub-section 4 BtmG (former version) of the German Law on Narcotics. Those provisions, which are thoroughly discussed in the judgment, and which are appended to the judgment as confirmation of the final judgment by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, provide as follows:
Section 29. Law on Narcotics\Criminal acts
Sub-section 1
A punishment up to 4 years of [e]mprisonment or a fine are to be expected by whoever
(a) cultivates, produces, deals with or, without dealing, imports, exports, sells, hands over or else distributes, acquires or provides some way or another narcotics (sub-sub-section 1)
Notwithstanding this provision, the Court, citing Mr. Leitmann's past criminal history, for which only fines had been assessed, and his leadership role in the offense, found aggravating circumstances for applying the tougher, newly-enacted version of Section 29—which was enacted to deal with drug dealing and other manifestations of organized crime—which allowed imprisonment of from one to fifteen years. Therefore, it deemed a prison sentence of five years to be a fair sentence under this provision.
. . . . .
Sub-sub-section 3
In particularly serious cases, the sentence of imprisonment shall not be less than a year. As a rule, a serious case is deemed to be present whenever
. . . . .
Sub-sub-section 4 [hyphen before section added]
someone deals with a non negligible quantity, has a non negligible quantity in his possession or hands over a non negligible quantity
The dual criminality test does not require that the offense in the Federal Republic of Germany have an identical counterpart in United States law; the test is met if the "essential character" of the wrongdoing is the same and the laws are "substantially analogous." Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 1987). To determine whether the test is met, the court may consider federal law and the law of Illinois. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 1997); Messina, 728 F.2d at 79. Although United States laws do not address the conduct charged against Mr. Leitmann in identical terms, the conduct of which he was found guilty in the Federal Republic of Germany violates this nation's criminal laws as well. Under Illinois law, for example, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly manufacture or deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Violation of this law is punishable by imprisonment of from six years to sixty (60) years, depending on the quantity of the substance, with respect to the manufacture or delivery of cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A-D).
Similarly, federal law makes it a criminal offense for any person to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. Violation of the law is punishable by prison sentences of various lengths depending on the type and quantity of the drug involved. 21 U.S.C. § 841.
This Court concludes that the conduct of which Mr. Leitmann was convicted is criminal within the meaning of both the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and the laws of the United States.
5. Competent Legal Evidence to Support a Finding of Probable Cause
The court is required to make a finding based upon the criminal standard of probable cause. The standard of proof of probable cause (that a crime was committed and that the person before the court committed it) is the same standard as defined in federal law, Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 1993); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1980), that is, evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to entertain a reasonable belief in the guilt of the accused. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Fourth Circuit has explained the inquiry as follows:
The extradition hearing is not designed as a full trial. The purpose is to inquire into the presence of probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of one or more of the criminal laws of the extraditing country, that the alleged conduct, if committed in the United States, would have been a violation of our criminal law, and that the extradited individual is the one sought by the foreign nation for trial on the charge of violation of its criminal laws.Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976). Evidence that may be considered at an extradition hearing is similar to evidence that may be considered at a preliminary examination. Bovio, 989 F.2d at 259; United States v. Barr, 619 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Hearsay testimony may be considered and may form the basis for a finding of probable cause "in whole or in part." Bovio, 989 F.2d at 259 (citing Collings v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922), and quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 5.1(a)). The extradition statutes specifically authorize the court to receive written materials as evidence for purposes of an extradition hearing so long as they are
properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required.18 U.S.C. § 3190.
Where, as in this case, the person whose extradition is requested has been convicted in the requesting state, the probable cause requirement is satisfied by production of the record of the foreign judgment and conviction. See Matter of Extradition of Sidali, 899 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (D.N.J. 1995) ("when an individual to be extradited has already been convicted, all that is necessary to establish probable cause is the record of the judgment of conviction."); Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 374 ("a judgment of conviction . . . a fortiori establishes probable cause."), aff'd, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991).
In this case, the United States Attorney has submitted two original Certificates of Edward H. Wilkinson, Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs of the United States of America at Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, in which Mr. Wilkinson certifies that the attached papers constitute the supporting documentation for extradition of Mr. Leitmann for the crime of illegal trafficking in narcotics. Mr. Wilkinson certified that the documents are "properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received in evidence for similar purposes by the tribunals of the Federal Republic of Germany. . . ." (Certificates to be attached to documentary evidence accompanying Requisitions in the United States for Extradition, January 5, 1999 and February 12, 1999, signed by Edward H. Wilkinson.) Included among the materials submitted by Mr. Wilkinson with the January 5, 1999 Certificate is the November 12, 1992 judgment of the Tubingen Regional Court. In its lengthy judgment, the Tubingen court has found Mr. Leitmann guilty of intentional illegal dealing with narcotics and imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment. This judgment constitutes competent legal evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
6. Mr. Leitmann's Objections to Certification of Extraditability are Insufficient
On his own behalf and through his attorney, Mr. Leitmann has raised several arguments against the Federal Republic of Germany's request for extradition. They are as follows:
The Court notes that Mr. Leitmann does not contest his identity as the individual named in the Extradition Request. Indeed, he admits that he left Germany in 1992 and that he has lived openly, under his own name, and has notified the German authorities of his whereabouts. Moreover, in his post-hearing personal submission, Mr. Leitmann asserts that, during his trial, he was not allowed to be present on certain days or to examine witnesses, which, in his opinion, was a violation of human rights. These admissions would contradict any assertion that he is not the individual named in the Extradition Request.
(a) Adequacy of Documents Submitted in Support of Extradition Request
Mr. Leitmann, citing Article 14 of the Treaty, asserts that the absence of some of the specified documents from the Extradition Request renders the request invalid. The relevant sections of Article 14 provide as follows:
Channel of Communication; Extradition Documents
(1) The request for extradition, any subsequent documents and all other communications shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel unless otherwise provided by the Treaty.
(2) The request shall be accompanied by:
(a) All available information concerning the identity and nationality of the person sought;
(b) The text of all applicable provisions of law of the Requesting State concerning the definition of the offense, its punishment and the limitation of legal proceedings or the enforcement of penalties; and
(c) A statement by a competent authority describing the measures taken, if any, that have interrupted the period of limitation under the law of the Requesting State.
. . . . .
(4) A request for the extradition of a person sought by reason of a judgment of guilt for the imposition or enforcement of a penalty or detention order shall be accompanied, in addition to the documents provided for in paragraph (2), by:
(a) If the judgment handed down in the territory of the Requesting State contains only a determination of guilt, this judgment, confirmation that a judgment has final and binding effect and a warrant of arrest issued by a competent authority of the Requesting State;
(b) If the judgment handed down in the territory of the Requesting State contains the determination of guilt and the sentence imposed, a copy of this judgment of conviction as well as the confirmation that this judgment has final and binding effect and is enforceable and a statement of the portion of the sentence that has not been served.
First, Mr. Leitmann notes that the Federal Republic of Germany did not include with the Extradition Request information concerning his identity and nationality, as required by Article 14(2)(a) of the Treaty. The Court notes that, while such specific identifying information did not accompany the Extradition Request, the judgment entered by the Tubingen court contained a detailed history of Mr. Leitmann, from his birth to his conviction and sentencing. Moreover, the Extradition Request itself includes Mr. Leitmann's correct name, date of birth, and place of birth. Said information clearly shows that Mr. Leitmann is a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty—which permits the requesting state to submit additional evidence upon request of the requested state—the Federal Republic of Germany has submitted to the United States, post-hearing, an original authenticated fingerprint card, including custodial photographs of Mr. Leitmann, which card contains identifying information consistent with that contained in the judgment. Finally, Mr. Leitmann's identity is not at issue in these proceedings, since he admits that he is the individual who was tried and convicted in the Federal Republic of Germany proceedings pursuant to which he is being sought.
The Court finds, therefore, that the information concerning Mr. Leitmann's identity and nationality is sufficient to support the Extradition Request.
(b) Text of Applicable Provisions of Law concerning Definition of the Charged Offense
Mr. Leitmann alleges that the Federal Republic of Germany did not include, with its request, the text of all applicable provisions of law relating to the charged offense, as required by Article 14(2)(b) of the Treaty. In this regard, the Court notes that the Federal Republic of Germany did not include the text of the applicable criminal statutes, as a separate document, with its Extradition Request. However, the Tubingen court judgment set forth, with specificity, the applicable statute under which Mr. Leitmann was charged and convicted.
Mr. Leitmann notes that the request for extradition states that he is charged with illegal "trafficking" in narcotics, but that no text of German law has been provided regarding "trafficking" in narcotics. He notes further that the Tubingen court's judgment sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, while the statutes attached to the Extradition Request prescribes a maximum sentence of four years upon conviction. The Court finds that whether the request for extradition used the word "trafficking" in narcotics or "intentional illegal dealing with drugs"—which were the words used in the judgment—is a distinction without a difference. It is clear that Mr. Leitmann was charged, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating Section 29 of the German Law on Narcotics. The provisions of that Section are set forth by the Public Prosecutor in an attachment to the judgment.
With regard to the seeming discrepancy in Mr. Leitmann's sentence between the court judgment and that prescribed by the statutes under which he was sentenced, the Tubingen court noted that he was being sentenced under the tougher, newly-enacted version of Section 29, pursuant to which it deemed a prison term of five years to be fair. ( see n. 2.) The Tubingen court having interpreted its country's statute to allow it to impose the sentence which it imposed, this Court will not question that interpretation in this proceeding.
(c) Text of Provisions of Law concerning the Limitation of Legal Proceedings or Enforcement of Penalties
Mr. Leitmann notes the absence from the Extradition Request of any text regarding the statute of limitations for instituting legal proceedings or serving sentences, as also required by Article 14(2)(b) of the Treaty. However, while such documents did not accompany the Extradition Request, the Public Prosecutor of Tubingen—pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty—has submitted an authenticated "Attestation", dated February 9, 1999, in which the prescription periods (statutes of limitation) are set forth. Thus, according to the Public Prosecutor's recitation of the applicable statute, the prescription period for someone sentenced to prison for a term in excess of one year and up to five years, is ten years. The prescription period began on the date the judgment became final, which was on August 13, 1993, according to the Public Prosecutor. Therefore, the prescription period for Mr. Leitmann's sentence will not run until August 13, 2003. The Court finds that the statement by the Public Prosecutor that the limitation period for the execution of Mr. Leitmann's sentence has not yet run, is a statement by "competent authority" within the meaning of Article 14(2)(c) of the Treaty.
These documents are properly authenticated by the February 12, 1999 Certificate signed by Edward H. Wilkinson.
(d) Proper Authentication of Documents
Mr. Leitmann asserts that one of the documents submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the Extradition Request has not been properly authenticated. He asserts that the Confirmation about a Final Judgement and an Executable Sentence, which was signed and submitted by the Public Prosecutor, was not authenticated by a diplomatic or consular officer, as required by Article 14(4)(b) of the Treaty and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3190.
Edward H. Wilkinson is the Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs of the United States at Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany. As such, he is the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in the Federal Republic of Germany, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3190. Mr. Wilkinson's Certificates, dated January 5, 1999 and February 12, 1999, certified that all of the documents annexed thereto were properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received in evidence in extradition proceedings in the Federal Republic of Germany. The documents annexed to the Certificate includes the confirmation submitted by the Public Prosecutor and is, therefore, properly authenticated.
(e) Allegations of Human Rights Violations by the Federal Republic of Germany
While not raised at the hearing, Mr. Leitmann, in a pro se, post-hearing motion, asserts that he should not be extradited to the Federal Republic of Germany because that country engaged in violations of human rights by not allowing him to examine witnesses at his trial and by not allowing him to be present on certain days of the trial. He alleges that he was thereby denied a fair trial by the local authorities, who were intent on finding him guilty, in violation of the United Nations Charter.
The Court understands Mr. Leitmann's argument regarding his alleged lack of ability to examine witnesses and to be present throughout his trial as invoking international human rights protections. However, the Treaty itself does not provide an exception to extradition where to do so would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations, and an affirmative defense not specified in the Treaty itself is ordinarily not considered by the extradition court. See DeSilva, 125 F.3d at 1112. Moreover, the fact that the courts of a requesting country might not adhere to the high constitutional standards applied by courts in the United States would not, in and of itself, justify a refusal to extradite a fugitive to that country.
Regardless of what constitutional protections are given to persons held for trial in the courts of the United States or of the constituent states thereof, those protections cannot be claimed by an accused whose trial and conviction have been held or are to be held under the laws of another nation, acting according to its traditional processes and within the scope of its authority and jurisdiction.Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, at 866 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 77 (2nd Cir. 1960).
Accordingly, Mr. Leitmann's Motion Opposing Extradition Based on Human Rights Violations is hereby denied.
Findings and Conclusions
For the reasons set forth above, this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. This Court is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 to conduct an extradition hearing;
2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Jurgen Leitmann and subject matter jurisdiction over this case;
3. There is currently in force an Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany;
4. Jurgen Leitmann, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, has been charged with, convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment by a duly constituted court of the Federal Republic of Germany on charges of intentional illegal dealing with drugs;
5. The charges of which Mr. Leitmann was convicted and sentenced also constitute a crime under the laws of the United States;
6. These charges constitute extraditable offenses within the meaning of Article Two of the Extradition Treaty;
7. The Federal Republic of Germany seeks the extradition of Jurgen Leitmann for service of the sentence imposed on these charges; and
8. There is probable cause to believe that Jurgen Leitmann committed the offenses for which extradition is sought.
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court finds and concludes that Jurgen Leitmann is extraditable for the offense for which extradition was requested and certifies this finding to the United States Secretary of State, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a certified copy of this Certification of Extraditability be delivered by the Clerk of the Court of this District to the Assistant United States Attorney for this District for transmission to the United States Secretary of State.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jurgen Leitmann remain in the custody of the United States Marshal for this District pending final disposition of this matter by the Secretary of State and the arrival of agents of the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of his return to the Federal Republic of Germany.