The 1981 Legislature completely revised the county court structure, effective January 1, 1983, by abolishing the previous three-tiered system of county courts and creating a single county court in each county, with full-time law-trained judges. 1981 N.D.Sess.Laws Ch. 319; 1981 Report of the North Dakota Legislative Council 70 (1981); see Matter of Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454, 456 (N.D. 1985). Chapter 33-01, N.D.C.C., was repealed, including the provision requiring transfer of cases to the district court when an issue of title was raised. See 1981 N.D.Sess.Laws Ch. 319, § 51. Thus, the Legislature has removed any statutory impediment to the county court's exercise of jurisdiction in an eviction action where an issue of title has been raised.

1-17, 30.1-02-02. These changes in county court jurisdiction were addressed in In re Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1985), where we held that the county courts have concurrent jurisdiction in regard to trusts as do the district courts, conferring upon them equitable jurisdiction in trust matters under the Uniform Probate Code. As a result of Binder, the holdings of Jones and Edinger which held that county courts have no equitable jurisdiction were no longer dispositive of equitable jurisdictional limitations imposed upon the county courts. In 1981, the Legislature adopted section 30.1-02-06.

Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13. An action for eviction invokes a court's equitable jurisdiction. In re Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454, 456 (N.D. 1985). Payment or nonpayment of a sum of money is a question of fact. First Interstate Bank of Fargo, N.A. v. Rebarchek, 511 N.W.2d 235, 243 (N.D. 1994). Whether or not a certain state of facts is contrary to equity is a conclusion of law. Midland Diesel Serv. Engine Co. v. Sivertson, 307 N.W.2d 555, 557 (N.D. 1981).

See N.D.C.C. §§ 27-05-06 (jurisdiction of district courts); 30.1-02-02 (district court jurisdiction of guardianships and trusts); 30.1-33-01 (district court jurisdiction of trusts); 30.1-33-04 (district court jurisdiction of litigation involving trusts and third parties); 59-04-02 (supervised administration of trusts in district court). Cf. Matter of Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454, 455-58 (N.D. 1985) (decided before elimination of county courts; discussing district and county court jurisdiction over equitable claims involving trusts); Matter of Bo, 365 N.W.2d 847, 850-51 (N.D. 1985) (involving consolidated appeals from county court conservatorship and district court trust proceedings). [¶ 16] Section 30.1-34-06(4), N.D.C.C., says "[t]he question of liability as between the trust estate and the trustee individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or indemnification, or other appropriate proceeding."

Such a broad grant of authority is consistent with the legislature's general grant of greater power to the county courts, which became effective January 1, 1983. See Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1985). Because county courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over probate, they had all the incidental powers necessary for the adjudication of probate matters.Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1990).

County courts derive their jurisdiction solely from the state constitution and statutory law. Matter of Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1985). Under NDCC 30.1-02-02 the county court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to probate. However, neither party has suggested that the court would have authority to divest Orlando of his interest in the SW1/4 that Julia gifted to him in 1976, and we are unaware of any law that would give the court jurisdiction over that completed gift.

We may award a cost sanction against a party who does not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Matter of Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454, 458 (N.D. 1985); Matter of Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 897 (N.D. 1983). We grant Nancy's request for $50 as a sanction for Michael's noncompliance with Rule 30(b), N.D.R.App.P.

The county court derives its jurisdiction from our state Constitution and from our statutes. South Forks Shopping Center, Inc. v. Dastmalchi, 446 N.W.2d 440 (N.D. 1989); Matter of Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1985). Section 27-07.

Since the 1976 constitutional amendment creating a "unified judicial system," the trend has been to improve the county courts and to enlarge their jurisdiction and powers. See N.D. Const. art. VI, § 1; 1981 N.D. Laws, ch. 319; 1983 N.D. Laws, ch. 352; 1985 N.D. Laws, ch. 272, § 31 and ch. 338; 1987 N.D. Laws, ch. 375, § 1; and Matter of Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1985). Nevertheless, the authority of county courts continues to be circumscribed by statute.

For illustrations of probate decrees, judgments and orders recently treated as final and appealable, see Matter of Estate of Tuntland, 364 N.W.2d 513 (N.D. 1985); Matter of Estate of Vertin, 381 N.W.2d 199 (N.D. 1986); Matter of Estate of Frandson, 383 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1986); Matter of Estate of Sorensen, 411 N.W.2d 362 (N.D. 1987); Matter of Estate of Nelson, 419 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 1988); and Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816 (N.D. 1988). See also Dahner v. Daner, 374 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1985); Binder v. Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1986); Matter of Estate of Binder, 386 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1986); Matter of Conservatorship of Gessler, 419 N.W.2d 541 (N.D.App. 1988). In the phrasing of Rule 54(b), it is obvious that these rulings adjudicate "fewer than all of the claims" and do "not terminate the action."