Similarly, our State courts have consistently supported the proposition that a person may be ordered to display nontestimonial physical characteristics, including handwriting, without infringement of Fifth Amendment privileges. (See People v Goldberg, 19 N.Y.2d 460, 465-466; People v Craft, 28 N.Y.2d 274, 276-277; Matter of Erlbaum v Gold, 49 A.D.2d 594; People v Rogers, 86 Misc.2d 868; People v Sanders, 58 A.D.2d 525; People v Evans, 90 Misc.2d 195; People v Schwartz, NYLJ, April 14, 1976, p 9, col 1; People v Sims, NYLJ, April 27, 1976, p 6, col 4.) By his present application (for court-ordered appearance and submission of handwriting samples) the Special Prosecutor has not stripped the respondent of any constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, nor of any protective immunity which might otherwise be available to him.

To be sure, if the right to "seize" defendant's person had not already been established, or if the "seizure" of the evidence sought involved an invasion of defendant's personal dignity or intrusion into his body, procedural due process would have required notice and a hearing. It is significant that in each of the cases relied upon in People v. Giglio ( 74 A.D.2d 348, 355, supra) as authority for requiring notice and a hearing, either the person from whom the evidence was sought was not then yet the subject of a pending criminal charge ( Matter of Erlbaum v. Gold, 49 A.D.2d 594; Matter of District Attorney of Kings County v Angelo G., 48 A.D.2d 576, app dsmd 38 N.Y.2d 923) or the identifying evidence sought required a physical intrusion or significant invasion of privacy not present here ( Matter of Barber v. Rubin, 72 A.D.2d 347; People v. Vega, 51 A.D.2d 33). These authorities are, therefore, completely distinguishable from the instant case. The only procedural due process question that can remain is whether, in its context and under the procedures used, compelling defendant to speak denied him a fair trial.

We do not doubt that the prosecution in a proper case may obtain voice exemplars before trial or even before indictment (see, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1; United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19; Ann. 24 ALR3d 1261). But we have made it a requirement that the prosecution's applications to obtain this and other modes of discovery — such as handwriting samples, or hair specimens — follow the precepts of procedural due process (Matter of District Attorney of Kings County v. Angelo G., 48 A.D.2d 576, app dsmd 38 N.Y.2d 923; Matter of Erlbaum v. Gold, 49 A.D.2d 594; People v. Vega, 51 A.D.2d 33; Matter of Barber v. Rubin 72 A.D.2d 347). Thus we said in Angelo G. (p 580): "We see no violation of due process under the proceedings initiated by the District Attorney. The appellants were served with the notice of the application and with the supporting papers.