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Matter of Empire State Restr. v. Rapoport

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jun 16, 1997
240 A.D.2d 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

Opinion

June 16, 1997

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Coppola, J.).


Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by (1) deleting therefrom the provision declaring that the petitioners have standing to bring the proceeding and substituting therefor a provision declaring that the petitioners do not have standing to bring the proceeding, (2) deleting therefrom the provision that the negative declaration by the respondent Board of Health of the County of Westchester was not arbitrary and capricious, and (3) adding thereto a provision declaring that the April 1, 1996, amendments to the Westchester County Sanitary Code Article XX are valid; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs to the respondents.

The two vacancies on the thirteen-member Board of Health of the County of Westchester (hereinafter the Board), when the Board adopted the amendments to the Westchester County Sanitary Code Article XX by a vote of 10 to 1, did not render the adoption of the amendments invalid ( see, General Construction Law § 41; Matter of Wolkoff v. Chassin, 89 N.Y.2d 250; Matter of Town of Smithtown v. Howell, 31 N.Y.2d 365; Rockland Woods v. Incorporated Vil. of Suffern, 40 A.D.2d 385; Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Farmingdale v. Inglis, 17 A.D.2d 655).

Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the petitioners lack standing to mount this SEQRA-based challenge against the Board. To qualify for standing to raise a SEQRA challenge, a party must demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solely economic in nature ( see, Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 87 N.Y.2d 668, 687; Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 428, 433). Here, the individual petitioners failed to demonstrate that they would suffer any environmental injury as a result of the prohibition of smoking in restaurant dining areas ( see, Matter of Stephens v. Gordon, 202 A.D.2d 437; Montes Waste Sys. v Town of Oyster Bay, 199 A.D.2d 493). Similarly, the petitioner Empire State Restaurant Tavern Association lacks standing because it failed to meet the key requirement to organizational standing; i.e., that "one or more of its members would have standing to sue" ( Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 775; see, Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy. v Planning Bd., 213 A.D.2d 484, 486). Because the CPLR article 78 proceeding should have been dismissed for lack of standing, the Supreme Court erred in addressing whether the Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious.

Finally, with respect to the action for declaratory relief, which the appellants had standing to seek, the Supreme Court should have directed the entry of a declaration in favor of the Board ( see, Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 334, cert denied 371 U.S. 901).

O'Brien, J.P., Goldstein, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Matter of Empire State Restr. v. Rapoport

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jun 16, 1997
240 A.D.2d 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
Case details for

Matter of Empire State Restr. v. Rapoport

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of EMPIRE STATE RESTAURANT TAVERN ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Jun 16, 1997

Citations

240 A.D.2d 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
658 N.Y.S.2d 687