Matter of Grace, 62 Misc.2d 51, 55, 308 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sur.Ct. 1970). See also Matter of Van Deusen, 24 Misc.2d at 614, 196 N.Y.S.2d 737; Matter of Edwards, 196 Misc. 997, 1005, 92 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sur.Ct. 1949). Chase's periodic accountings set forth only the address of the Glassmanor apartments, the maturity date of the loan, the outstanding principal and interest payments received.
The general rule is that every decree of the Surrogate's Court is conclusive as to all matters embraced therein against every person over whom jurisdiction was obtained ( see Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N.Y. 351, 358, supra; Matter of Ziegler, 161 Misc.2d 203, affd 213 A.D.2d 280, supra; Matter of Seaman, supra; In re Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 267 A.D. 783, affg 38 N.Y.S.2d 827; Matter of Chaves, supra; Matter of Hammond, supra; Krimsky v. Lombardi, supra; Matter of Sutro, supra; Matter of Malkoski, supra; see also Wallacev. Ford, 44 Misc.2d 313; Matter of Van Deusen, 24 Misc.2d 611; Matter of Jones, 13 Misc.2d 678; Matter of Payne, 12 Misc.2d 861; Matter of Crawford, 207 Misc. 145; Matter of Floesch, 197 Misc. 753; Matter of Edwards, 196 Misc. 997; Matter of Slote, 188 Misc. 144; Millard v. McFadden, 185 Misc. 771; Matter of Renn, 181 Misc. 976; Matter of Massimino, 143 Misc. 119; Matter of Menzie, 54 Misc. 188). This rule had become so embedded in estate and trust practice, and was so widely recognized, that the drafters of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act saw no need to include a provision similar to that found in former section 274 of the Surrogate's Court Act, which had codified the rule.
But here there is no basis for an estoppel. None of the parties interested on either side has changed his position. (See previous decision in this case, viz., Matter of Edwards, 196 Misc. 997. See, also, Matter of Feldhus, 165 Misc. 122, and cases there cited.
None of the parties interested on either side has changed his position. (See previous decision in this case, viz., Matter of Edwards, 196 Misc. 997. See, also, Matter of Feldhus, 165 Misc. 122, and cases there cited.) (5) The testator's intent in relation to paragraph "Third" of the will, that he thought he was limiting his widow to an equitable life estate, is demonstrated by considering the preceding paragraph "Second", by which he provided an outright bequest for the benefit of his wife.
In this court recent occasion arose to consider and determine whether a point having a superficial appearance of having been determined in a previous decree had actually been adjudicated in the sense of having been forever set at rest as res judicata. See Matter of Edwards ( 196 Misc. 997) toward the end of which cogent and controlling authorities are cited and applied to the effect that language in a judgment or decree is not to be regarded as a final determination of the title to property unless it can be fairly seen that the specific question of title was before the court for adjudication in a previous litigation wherein, in a fair and reasonable sense, the question had been at issue and all the interested parties, or their predecessors in interest, had had a "day in court" with respect to the matter in question, or that the circumstances were such as to constitute a basis for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny the status of the matter as being res judicata. In respect to the valuation of assets of the estate here in question, there were, of course, no pleadings framing issues, no controverted question, either of fact or law, submitted for consideration and determination at the time the pro forma tax order was entered.
In this court recent occasion arose to consider and determine whether a point having a superficial appearance of having been determined in a previous decree had actually been adjudicated in the sense of having been forever set at rest as res judicata. See Matter of Edwards (196 Misc. 997) toward the end of which cogent and controlling authorities are cited and applied to the effect that language in a judgment or decree is not to be regarded as a final determination of the title to property unless it can be fairly seen that the specific question of title was before the court for adjudication in a previous litigation wherein, in a fair and reasonable sense, the question had been at issue and all the interested parties, or their predecessors in interest, had had a "day in court" with respect to the matter in question, or that the circumstances were such as to constitute a basis for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny the status of the matter as being res judicata. In respect to the valuation of assets of the estate here in question, there were, of course, no pleadings framing issues, no controverted question, either of fact or law, submitted for consideration and determination at the time the pro forma tax order was entered.