An ordinance is distinguished from a resolution by the greater formality required for its enactment (Village Law, § 90; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 15.02, supra). An ordinance provides a permanent rule of government or conduct designed to affect matters arising subsequent to its adoption ( Matter of Edgewood Ave. in City of Mount Vernon, 195 Misc. 314, 323-324, affd. 275 App. Div. 853; Town of Poestenkill v. Sicho, 54 Misc.2d 191, 194; Russell Sage Coll. v. City of Troy, 24 Misc.2d 344, 345-347; Kij v. Aszkler, 163 Misc. 63, 64; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 15.02, esp. at p. 43, and § 15.06, esp. at p. 57, supra). A resolution deals with matters of a temporary or special nature, where the action taken generally involves findings of fact and may be characterized as administrative ( Matter of Collins v. City of Schenectady, 256 App. Div. 389, 392, supra; 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 4.05; Kleiber v. City of San Francisco, 18 Cal.2d 718, 724, supra; Allen v. Wise, 204 Ga. 415, 417).
In Matter of Jewett v Luau-Nyack Corp. ( 31 N.Y.2d 298, 305-306), the Court of Appeals noted: "An ordinance is distinguished from a resolution by the greater formality required for its enactment (Village Law, § 90; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 15.02, supra). An ordinance provides a permanent rule of government or conduct designed to affect matters arising subsequent to its adoption ( Matter of Edgewood Ave. in City of Mount Vernon, 195 Misc. 314, 323-324, aff'd. 276 App. Div. 853; Town of Poestenkill v. Sicho, 54 Misc.2d 191, 194; Russell Sage Coll. v. City of Troy, 24 Misc.2d 344, 345-347; Kij v. Aszkler, 163 Misc. 63, 64; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 15.02, esp. at p. 43, and § 15.06, esp. at p. 57, supra).
May 23, 1949. Present — Johnston, Acting P.J., Adel, Sneed, Wenzel and MacCrate, JJ. [ 195 Misc. 314.] [See post, p. 1045.] Appeal by the City of Mount Vernon from an order (1) declaring the acts and proceedings of the commissioner of assessment and taxation of that city, in the preparation, execution and filing of a certain assessment roll for a sewer improvement, the assessment roll itself, and the confirmation thereof by the common council of the city, void and of no effect; (2) vacating and annulling the assessment and warrant for the levy, by virtue of such assessment, upon respondents' property; and (3) directing that the assessment and warrant be struck from the tax list, records and rolls of the city.
The court does not concur with this cleavage of language suggested by the plaintiff since the twofold purpose developed therefrom is singularly inconsistent with what the court considers to be the over-all legislative purpose. An examination of the method by which the plaintiff approved the application is also significant. A resolution is merely declaratory of the will of the corporation in a given matter and is in the nature of a ministerial act ( Matter of Collins v. City of Schenectady, 256 App. Div. 389). Defined in another manner, a resolution is an act of the governing body of a temporary nature and not a permanent rule of government designed to carry into effect matters subsequent to its passage ( Kij v. Aszkler, 163 Misc. 63; Collins v. City of Schenectady, supra; Matter of Edgewood Ave., 195 Misc. 314, affd. 275 App. Div. 853). A resolution, therefore, could not be relied upon to grant the continuing control and supervision in the manner suggested by the plaintiff. The court concludes, therefore, that the plaintiff is without authority, having approved the establishment of the subject landing strip or airport, to enjoin defendants through the vehicle of section 249 Gen. Bus. of the General Business Law. A judgment may enter accordingly.
(See 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1449.) The petitioners, citing Matter of Edgewood Ave., City of Mount Vernon ( 195 Misc. 314, affd. 275 App. Div. 853) urge that the Common Council did lack the authority to levy the assessments in that there is no statute, local law or general ordinance "providing regular procedure to be followed in exercise of the Council's power to direct" local assessments. It is true that the grant of power to the city by action of its Common Council to construct sewers as local public improvements and to assess and levy the cost thereof, in whole or in part, upon the property benefited thereby, is general in terms (see General City Law, § 20, subds.