The circumstances are: oral notice was conceded, the trial court offered a continuance which the child rejected, all the noticed parties appeared and there is no claim of prejudice resulting from the allegedly missing written notice. See Matter of Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1975). (c) Subsection four requires the court to consider whether the child is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities.

consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the adult consequences of criminal behavior, but to still hold children committing delinquent acts accountable for their actions to the extent of the child's age, education, mental and physical condition, background and all other relevant factors[.] NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-2(A) (1993) (emphasis added); see In re Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 482, 542 P.2d 61, 62 (Ct.App. 1975) ("Those sections of the Children's Code [referring to a child's constitutional and statutory rights] must be read in light of the legislative purposes expressed in the Code."). {38} In addition to conforming to the language and purpose of Section 32A-2-14, the "reasonable suspicion" standard places no additional burden on either the courts or law enforcement since the standard is already used to assess whether law enforcement has conformed to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

In reviewing an attack of a child's constitutional and statutory rights pursuant to the Children's Code, we agree with the Court of Appeals that "[t]hose sections of the Children's Code [referring to a child's constitutional and statutory rights] must be read in light of the legislative purposes expressed in the [Children's] Code. In re Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 482, 542 P.2d 61, 62 (Ct.App. 1975) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals recognized that one of the purposes or objectives of the Legislature, presently compiled as Subsection 32-1-2 (E), is:

We have more than just a failure of the court to advise a child who is represented by counsel of the child's rights. See In re Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1975).

We add that there is no claim of prejudice resulting from the failure to comply with the time requirement. See Matter of Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1975). Quantum of Proof

Not having been harmed by the technical violation, the lack of notice of the purpose of the preliminary inquiry did not require dismissal of the petition. Matter of Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1975). The Preliminary Inquiry

It is the State's position that, in the absence of a requirement of dismissal of a petition in Rule 23(c), the question becomes one of judicial discretion. Cited in support thereof are Matter of Jane Doe, 88 N.M. 505, 542 P.2d 1195 (Ct.App. 1975) and Matter of John Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1975). John Doe does not reach the matter of judicial discretion.

Where a child had counsel and had been advised of his rights, we required a showing of prejudice when the claim was that the child was not repeatedly advised of his rights. Matter of Doe, 88 N.M. 481, 542 P.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1975). This case is not similar.