Opinion
April 15, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Irma Vidal Santaella, J.).
We reject the petitioner's initial contention that the respondent Board of Education acted in excess of its authority in ordering him to submit to a medical examination. "Teachers in this State are generally required to submit to an examination to determine their physical and mental fitness to perform their duties (Education Law § 913)." (Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 69; see also, Matter of Stone v Gross, 25 A.D.2d 753, affd 19 N.Y.2d 675; Kurzius v Board of Educ., 81 A.D.2d 827; cf., Matter of Gordon v Board of Educ., 26 A.D.2d 545.) The language employed by the Legislature must be construed according to its "natural and most obvious sense" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94). Since the clear and unambiguous terms of Education Law § 913 indicate that the statute applies to "any school district" in the State, without limitation to location, the respondent properly directed the petitioner to undergo the medical evaluation.
In any event, the proceeding should have been dismissed as time-barred. The original demand to the petitioner that he submit to a medical examination, and the resulting determination that he was not fit to return to work, were made in 1984. Having failed to commence an article 78 proceeding within four months after that determination, the petitioner forfeited his right to challenge it (CPLR 217). Any subsequent medical examination, including that leading to the February 1990 determination at issue, was made at the petitioner's request for an independent medical evaluation, and did not involve any wrongful action by the Board. Accordingly, the petitioner's demand for back pay is moot.
We have considered the petitioner's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Kupferman and Asch, JJ.