The New York Human Rights Law prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because she is pregnant. See Diaz Chemical Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 237 A.D.2d 932, 654 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (4th Dep't 1997); Energy Expo, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 112 A.D.2d 302, 491 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749 (2d Dep't 1985). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in a discrimination case under state or federal law, a plaintiff need only plead the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination.

We conclude that "the conduct of [Matteliano and Jacob], viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is not sufficiently outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to exceed all bounds of decency" ( Albert v Solimon, 252 AD2d 139, 141, aff'd 94 NY2d 771; see Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303). The cases relied on by plaintiff are distinguishable inasmuch as the damages awarded for mental anguish in those cases arose out of other independent causes of action ( see e.g. Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 237 AD2d 932, 933, aff'd 91 NY2d 932; Miner v City of Glens Falls, 999 F2d 655, 662-663). Plaintiff did not raise any issues concerning the third joint cause of action against all defendants, and we therefore deem any issues with respect thereto abandoned ( see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984).

In addition, the complainant obtained an offer of employment following the birth of her child and, at most, her mental anguish would have been limited to the brief period of time when she was not collecting unemployment or disability benefits. In light of the nonspecific nature of the complainant's mental distress, we conclude that the maximum award for mental anguish supported by the evidence is $5,000 ( see generally Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 237 AD2d 932, 933, aff'd 91 NY2d 932; Matter of New York State Tug Hill Commn. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 52 AD3d 1169, 1171-1172). We therefore modify the determination accordingly.

She further testified that the experience was "very emotional" and caused an elevation of her blood pressure at her next prenatal visit to her physician, although the blood pressure problem was not ongoing and she attributed her emotional anguish in part to the fact that she was six months pregnant. In light of the nonspecific nature of the complainant's mental distress, we conclude that the maximum award for mental anguish and humiliation supported by the evidence is $10,000 ( see generally Matter of New York State Tug Hill Commn. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 52 AD3d 1169; Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 237 AD2d 932). We therefore modify the determination accordingly.

While we conclude that the determination is supported by substantial evidence ( see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 179-180), we further conclude that the award of damages for mental anguish and humiliation is excessive. Although mental anguish and humiliation may be proven by the testimony of the complainant alone ( see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v State Div. of Human Rights, 78 NY2d 207, 216), here the complainant sought no medical treatment, and her testimony in support of the award of damages for mental anguish and humiliation was sparse. In our view, an award of $10,000 is "the maximum award supported by the evidence" ( Matter of New York State Tug Hill Commn. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 52 AD3d 1169, 1172; see generally Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 237 AD2d 932, 933, affd 91 NY2d 932), and we therefore modify the determination accordingly.

Petitioner seeks reinstatement of the ALJ's award of compensatory damages and commuting expenses. In reviewing an award of damages for mental anguish in a discrimination case, "a court will intervene only when the award is not reasonably related to the wrongdoing, is not supported by substantial evidence or does not compare with awards for similar injuries" ( Matter of New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 207 AD2d 585, 585-586; see, Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v State Div. of Human Rights, 78 NY2d 207, 219; Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 237 AD2d 932 [decided herewith]). In our view, the Commissioner's award of damages is not reasonably related to respondent's wrongdoing and does not compare with awards for similar injuries ( see, e.g., Matter of Lutheran Social Servs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 142 AD2d 950, affd 74 NY2d 824; cf., Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v Muia, 176 AD2d 1142; Matter of New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v McCall, 109 AD2d 953).

In Rainer N. Mitti, Opthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights ( 100 NY2d 326), the Court of Appeals expressly held that the Human Rights Law "prohibits discharge of an employee because of pregnancy," and "[t]he standards for establishing unlawful discrimination" in this context "are the same as those governing title VII cases" ( see id. at 330.) ( See also Matter of Board of Educ. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 56 NY2d 257, 261-62; Matter of Diaz Chem. Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 91 NY2d 932, aff'g 237 AD2d 932 [4th Dept 1997]; Matter of Galante Son v State Div. of Human Rights, 52 NY2d 962, aff'g 76 AD2d 1023 [3d Dept 1980].) The Appellate Division has also addressed alleged termination of employment because of pregnancy, but almost always on review of a determination by the State Division of Human Rights, and the opinions are not heavy on the facts.