Opinion
July 10, 1967
In this proceeding to discipline an attorney, petitioner moves for an order: (a) confirming the report of the Justice of the Supreme Court to whom this court had referred the issues to hear and report; and (b) accepting respondent's resignation as an attorney and counselor at law. The charges set forth in the petition arose out of three separate complaints filed with the petitioner Brooklyn Bar Association. The first complaint charged that in March, 1965 respondent received from complainant the sum of $5,400 for investment in a second mortgage. Thereupon, respondent prepared and delivered to complainant and his wife a purported second mortgage and mortgage note on certain described premises. The mortgage bore the name and signature of a third party, which signature was taken by respondent as a notary public. The original of the mortgage was given to respondent for the purpose of having it recorded. The petition further alleged that the complainant relied upon the representation made by respondent concerning the ownership of the property and that respondent acted as attorney for the mortgagor and mortgagees; that the mortgagor did not, in fact, own the property; that the mortgage was never recorded by respondent; and that respondent never disclosed to complainant that the mortgagor did not own the property. In addition, the petition included an allegation that complainant and his wife loaned to respondent the sum of $1,500 and respondent executed and delivered a promissory note for said amount payable on demand. In February, 1966 complainant demanded payment and respondent issued a check which was returned for insufficient funds. The second complaint charged that respondent applied to complainant (a title insurance company) for a mortgage insurance policy; that respondent issued a check to said company in the sum of $256.50 in payment of the premium and the company issued an insurance policy; that the check was returned for insufficient funds and no part of said sum was paid, except for $50, leaving a balance due of $206.50. The third complaint charged that in August, 1963, respondent, as seller, contracted with complainant, as an officer of the purchasing corporation, for the sale of certain premises. Thereafter, in September, 1963, respondent requested a loan from complainant, stating that he, respondent, had contracted to purchase another parcel of property and needed the money to consummate said purchase. Complainant agreed to give respondent the $1,000 on condition that the contract of sale for said property be assigned by respondent to complainant's corporation. Several months later, complainant learned that respondent had deeded this latter property to his sister and that he had deeded the property which he had contracted to sell to complainant to his sister, brother-in-law and nephew. Thereafter, respondent caused deeds to both properties to be given to complainant and advised complainant that only a first mortgage was closed on the first described premises. However, respondent failed to disclose that his sister had given a prior deed on the other property to a third person and that a mortgage had been foreclosed thereon, as a result of which the deed to complainant was worthless. The complaint further charged that respondent persuaded complainant not to record the deed to the first of the aforesaid parcels of property and, although respondent knew that an unrecorded deed to the property had been delivered to complainant, respondent caused a second and third mortgage to be placed on the property. In a supplemental petition the following charges were set forth: (a) respondent induced another party to purchase from him a $4,500 mortgage which he represented was a valid second mortgage when, in fact, respondent knew it was a third mortgage; thereafter, respondent, by false representations, defrauded a title insurance company by inducing said company to insure the assignment of the mortgage, as a result of which the company was caused to indemnify the assignee in the approximate sum of $4,600; and (b) in the years 1965 and 1966 respondent issued numerous checks drawn upon his accounts in various banks with the knowledge that there were insufficient funds to pay the same. At the final hearing before the Justice, respondent submitted his resignation as an attorney and counselor at law. The charges of professional misconduct made against respondent, if proved, would warrant disbarment. The motion is granted and respondent's resignation is hereby accepted and his name is ordered removed from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law, effective July 17, 1967. Beldock, P.J., Christ, Rabin, Benjamin and Munder, J.J., concur.