Opinion
May 8, 1995
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
Initially, we note that the Supreme Court should have disposed of the proceeding on the merits instead of transferring it to this Court (see, Town Law § 267-c). However, this Court will decide the case on the merits in the interest of judicial economy (see, Matter of Cucci v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 154 A.D.2d 372).
Upon our review of the record, we find that the respondents' determination was reasonable and rationally based upon substantial evidence. The petitioners' variance requests for their pool deck and fence were correctly denied since they failed to establish that, absent the granting of the variances, they would be unable to utilize their land (see, Matter of Slakoff v Hitchcock, 194 A.D.2d 613; Matter of Bienstock v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 187 A.D.2d 578; Matter of Grando v Town of Islip, 172 A.D.2d 663; see also, Matter of Fromer v Citrin, 187 A.D.2d 588). Contrary to the petitioners' contentions, a showing of practical difficulties must still be made to warrant the granting of an area variance. There is no discernible difference between the requirements set forth in Town Law § 267-b (3) (b) and those of the practical difficulty standard (see, Matter of Sasso v Osgood, 206 A.D.2d 837; Matter of O'Keefe v Donovan, 199 A.D.2d 681; Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 A.D.2d 662; see also, Matter of Clowry v Town of Pawling, 202 A.D.2d 663). In any event, upon our review of the record we find that the respondents' determination comports with the statutory standards of the Town Law.
We have reviewed the petitioners' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.