Opinion
October 5, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Driscoll, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, a CPLR article 78 proceeding may be summarily determined "upon the pleadings, papers and admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised" (CPLR 409 [b]; see, Matter of Barreca v. DeSantis, 226 A.D.2d 1085; see also, Matter of Filut v. New York State Educ. Dept., 91 A.D.2d 722, 723). Furthermore, it is well settled that "a defendant may be estopped to plead the Statute of Limitations where [the] plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentation or deception to refrain from filing a timely action" ( Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 448-449; see, East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. City of New York, 218 A.D.2d 628). In the present case, however, despite the petitioner's conclusory assertions to the contrary, the record is devoid of any factual support for his allegation that the Town Board of the Town of Hempstead (hereinafter the Town Board) lulled him into inactivity in order to allow the Statute of Limitations to expire. The court, therefore, properly dismissed the petition on the basis of the Statute of Limitations defense, since it was undisputed that the petitioner failed to commence this proceeding within four months after the Town Board adopted the resolution authorizing the Commissioner of the Department of Buildings to demolish the unsafe structures.
Copertino, J. P., Santucci, Goldstein and Luciano, JJ., concur.