Opinion
February 2, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Hayes, J.
Present — Denman, J.P., Boomer, Green, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law without costs and petition dismissed. Memorandum: Petitioner Mor-Lou Corporation owns and operates various real estate projects and renovates substandard housing in the City of Syracuse. Mor-Lou alleged in this CPLR article 78 proceeding that the city, its Common Council and Commissioner of Assessment acted arbitrarily, capriciously and unconstitutionally in denying Mor-Lou's bids for various tax-delinquent properties through the city's "Property Manager Program." Supreme Court erred in directing respondents to state upon the record the criteria used in marketing such properties and to indicate which of those criteria respondents applied in disapproving sales to petitioner.
A legislative body cannot be required to set general standards for areas in which it has discretion to act as long as it retains the authority to make individual decisions (see, Cummings v Town Bd., 62 N.Y.2d 833, 834). The City of Syracuse has retained such authority by section 6-202 (4) of the City Charter. Neither this ordinance nor State law (see, Real Property Tax Law § 1166) places any limitation upon the city's discretion.
Petitioner also has failed to establish any fundamental constitutional right which supports its claim of denial of due process or equal protection of the law. "Exercise of discretion in favor of one confers no right upon another to demand the same decision" (Matter of Larkin Co. v Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 336). An offer to buy property does not confer upon the offeror a constitutional right. Moreover, even assuming that petitioner was entitled to a reason for the city's refusal to sell, it is clear from the record that the city had three major concerns: (1) Mor-Lou's failure to occupy the premises after purchase; (2) opposition of several neighborhood and civic organizations to Mor-Lou's offers; (3) the alleged participation in the management of Mor-Lou's properties by a convicted arsonist. Any one of those concerns would have been sufficient and rational justification for respondents' actions. Accordingly, respondents' motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 7804 [f]) should have been granted.