Opinion
April 23, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Scholnick, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
We find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the infant petitioner leave to serve a late notice of claim. Although the appellant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation contends that the court was without jurisdiction to grant permission to serve a late notice of claim since the maximum 10-year statutory toll for infancy had elapsed (see, CPLR 208), the record establishes that the claims underlying this medical malpractice action stemmed from a course of treatment rendered to the infant petitioner on a continuous basis until March 15, 1979 (see, McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 407; Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151). Since the infant petitioner submitted his application for leave to serve a late notice of claim within 10 years of the date he last received treatment, the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in entertaining this application (see, Davidson v. Bronx Mun. Hosp., 64 N.Y.2d 59, 61; Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950, 954-956).
Additionally, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that it would suffer undue prejudice as a result of allowing the infant petitioner to proceed (see, Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256, 259; Dickey v. County of Nassau, 65 A.D.2d 780). Although the hospital in which the infant petitioner was treated has since closed, the hospital records are nevertheless available and these records contain sufficient information so as to permit the parties to fully investigate the claims asserted. Kunzeman, J.P., Eiber, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.