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Matter of D'Alessandro v. Board of Zoning

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Nov 25, 1991
177 A.D.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)

Opinion

November 25, 1991

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Christ, J.).


Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

We find the record devoid of any proof "in dollars and cents form" of the petitioners' inability to realize a reasonable return under existing permissible uses (see, Matter of Village Bd. v. Jarrold, 53 N.Y.2d 254, 257). Therefore, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate the requisite unnecessary hardship to entitle them to a use variance to utilize the subject premises as a two-family dwelling (see, Matter of Village Bd. v. Jarrold, supra; Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71).

Additionally, the petitioners derive no rights from a temporary variance which was issued to a prior owner of the subject premises in 1941. Although the Board impermissibly conditioned that variance on the continued occupancy of the premises by the prior owner (see, Matter of Dexter v. Town Bd., 36 N.Y.2d 102, 105; Matter of St. Onge v. Donovan, 71 N.Y.2d 507), the variance expired after two years pursuant to its terms and was not renewed (see, Matter of St. Onge v. Donovan, supra, at 520; 2 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice § 23.53 [3d ed]). Furthermore, the petitioners' reliance on a building permit issued pursuant to the 1941 variance, which does not refer to the temporary nature of the variance, cannot be regarded as in good faith. Insofar as the permit conflicted with the pertinent zoning provision, the petitioners were under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the facts underlying its issuance (see, Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274; cf., Matter of Jayne Estates v. Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417).

Finally, although the record is sparse in this regard, issuance of the 1941 variance was apparently premised on a finding of financial hardship on the part of the prior owner, and, therefore, the Board's denial of the petitioners' application did not constitute "a different result on essentially the same facts" (Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 N.Y.2d 516, 517; see also, Knight v. Amelkin, 68 N.Y.2d 975). Thompson, J.P., Harwood, Lawrence and Miller, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Matter of D'Alessandro v. Board of Zoning

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Nov 25, 1991
177 A.D.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
Case details for

Matter of D'Alessandro v. Board of Zoning

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of MICHELE D'ALESSANDRO et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Nov 25, 1991

Citations

177 A.D.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
577 N.Y.S.2d 79

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