" Mayer Brown LLP (John J. Tharp, Jr., of the Illinois bar, admitted pro hac vice, Lawrence R. Hamilton, Katherine E. Agonis, Robert T. Howell and J. Bishop Grewell of counsel) and Mayer Brown LLP, New York City ( Hector Gonzalez of counsel), for intervenor-appellant. I. Insurance Law § 3205 (b) allows an insured to freely transfer a policy procured on his own life and on his own initiative. ( Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P, 13 NY3d 270; Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Auth., 13 NY3d 223; 2004 Stuart Moldaw Trust v XE L.I.F.E., LLC, 642 F Supp 2d 226; Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v State of N.Y Dept. of Health, 83 NY2d 447; Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Howard, 92 NY2d 718; Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382; Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394; Scott v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 NY2d 429; Grigsby v Russell, 222 US 149; Steinback v Diepenbrock, 158 NY 24.) II. Public policy weighs against reading a "good faith" requirement into Insurance Law § 3205 (b). ( New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Caruso, 73 NY2d 74; Carter v Continental Life Ins. Co., 115 F2d 947; Matter of Orens v Novello, 99 NY2d 180; Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525; People v Nicholas, 97 NY2d 24; Rocchigiani v World Boxing Council, Inc., 131 F Supp 2d 527.) Dorsey Whitney LLP, New York City ( Patrick J. Feeley, Christopher G. Karagheuzoff, Joshua Colangelo-Bryan and Stephen M. Raab of counsel), for Phoenix Life Insurance Company, defendant.

Indeed, Justice Shulman ruled that to recalculate the property's assessed value for the tax years under review by going back to the first tax year in which the property was misclassified, but which was never challenged, and apply RPTL 1805 (2)'s 8% and 30% caps retroactively to all tax years from that tax year forward "would effectively rewrite history." In ascertaining whether Matter of JAM Enter., LLC or Matter of 436 Condominium Board of Mgrs. and Matter of Oakwood Condominium represent the correct view of the law which should be followed here, the court notes that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, it is fundamental that a court . . . should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" (Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Auth., 13 NY3d 223, 229 [2009], rearg denied 13 NY3d 927 [2010][internal quotations omitted]; see also Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270, 286 [2009]), "The starting point is always to look to the language itself and where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning" (Crucible Materials Corp., 13 NY3d at 229). Here, as quoted above, RPTL 1805 (2)'s clear and unambiguous language provides that the assessment of properties with less than 11 units will not increase by more than 8% in any year "as measured from the actual assessment on the previous year's assessment roll" and will not increase more than 30% over successive five-year periods starting in 1981 or the first year after 1981 that the property had less than 11 residential units.

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to its plain meaning. See Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.3d 539, 550, 914 N.Y.S.2d 709, 940 N.E.2d 535 (2010); Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v. New York Power Auth., 13 N.Y.3d 223, 229, 889 N.Y.S.2d 517, 918 N.E.2d 107 (2009). Moreover, a statute must be construed as a whole, with all parts read and construed together.

Legislature. ( Weiss v City of New York, 95 NY2d 1; Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385; Shapiro v Dwelling Mgrs., 92 AD2d 52, 60 NY2d 612; Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1; Ragsdale v Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 US 81; FDA v Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 US 120; Kerwick v New York State Bd. of Equalization Assessment, 117 AD2d 65.) III. The Rent Guidelines Board's remaining arguments have no merit. ( Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 NY3d 270; Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185; United States v Price, 361 US 304; Stein v Rent Guidelines Bd. for City of N.Y., 127 AD2d 189; Matter of Muriel Towers Co. v City of NY Rent Guidelines Bd., 117 Misc 2d 837, 94 AD2d 982, 60 NY2d 643; Matter of Chessin v New York City Conciliation Appeals Bd., 100 AD2d 297, 62 NY2d 977; Coalition Against Rent Increase Passalongs v Rent Guidelines Bd. for City of N.Y., 104 Misc 2d 101; Matter of Cintron v Calogero, 15 NY3d 347; Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Auth., 13 NY3d 223; People v Gilmour, 98 NY2d 126.) Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judges GRAFFEO, READ and PIGOTT concur with Judge SMITH; Judge CIPARICK dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge JONES concurs.

Appellants have failed to establish that New York State United Teachers' Freedom of Information Law request for the names of their employees falls squarely within the ambit of the fund-raising exemption of Public Officers Law § 89 (2) (b) (iii). ( Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine, 9 NY3d 454; Matter of Empire Realty Corp. v New York State Div. of Lottery, 230 AD2d 270; Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567; Matter of Hanig v State of NY Dept. of Motor Vehs., 79 NY2d 106; Matter of Federation of NY. State Rifle Pistol Clubs v New York City Police Dept., 73 NY2d 92; Matter of New York Teachers Pension Assn. v Teachers' Retirement Sys. of City of NY, 71 AD2d 250; Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Auth., 13 NY3d 223; Direen Operating Corp. v State Tax Commn., 46 AD2d 191.) Before: Judges GRAFFEO, READ and SMITH concur with Judge PIGOTT; Judge CIPARICK dissents in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judge JONES concur.

In response, Lifemark, Life Products, Berck, Lockwood, and Lockwood Pension argue that the language of § 3205 (b) (1) confers great freedom on an insured in assigning life insurance benefits, including the freedom to obtain insurance for any reason and to immediately assign a policy to an investor with no insurable interest, and that this freedom cannot be reconciled with any older common law "good faith" limitation. The "starting point" for discerning statutory meaning is, of course, the language of the statute itself (see Roberts v Tishman Speyer Props.,L.P. , 13 NY3d 270, 286). "[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Auth. , 13 NY3d 223, 229 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, § 3205 (b) (1) clearly provides that, so long as the insured is "of lawful age" and acts "on his own initiative," he can "procure or effect a contract of insurance upon his own person for the benefit of any person, firm, association or corporation" (Insurance Law § 3205 [b] [1]).

Reported below, 50 AD3d 1353. Motion for reargument denied [ see 13 NY3d 223 (2009)].

With this statutory framework in mind, we address petitioner's contention that the Justice Center lacked the statutory authority to make a finding of neglect against it. In so doing, we need not defer to the Justice Center's interpretation of the statutory provisions in question, as we are not called upon “to interpret a statute where ‘specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or ... an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom’ is at stake” (Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 13 N.Y.3d 270, 285, 890 N.Y.S.2d 388, 918 N.E.2d 900 [2009], quoting Matter of KSLM–Columbus Apts., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 N.Y.3d 303, 312, 801 N.Y.S.2d 783, 835 N.E.2d 643 [2005] ; see Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v. New York Power Auth., 13 N.Y.3d 223, 229, 889 N.Y.S.2d 517, 918 N.E.2d 107 [2009] ). Rather, the issue before us “is one of pure statutory interpretation dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent” (Matter of KSLM–Columbus Apts., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 5 N.Y.3d at 312, 801 N.Y.S.2d 783, 835 N.E.2d 643 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Ovadia v. Office of the Indus. Bd. of Appeals, 19 N.Y.3d 138, 144 n. 5, 946 N.Y.S.2d 86, 969 N.E.2d 202 [2012] ).

To that end, the court must first look to the statutory text ( see Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d at 721, 955 N.Y.S.2d 835, 979 N.E.2d 1162;Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to its plain meaning ( see Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.3d 539, 550, 914 N.Y.S.2d 709, 940 N.E.2d 535;Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v. New York Power Auth., 13 N.Y.3d 223, 229, 889 N.Y.S.2d 517, 918 N.E.2d 107). Moreover, a statute must be construed as a whole, with all parts being read and construed together ( see New York State Psychiatric Assn., Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Health, 19 N.Y.3d 17, 23–24, 945 N.Y.S.2d 191, 968 N.E.2d 428).

The approach advocated by petitioner completely ignores General Construction Law § 110, which provides that the General Construction Law is not intended to supply a missing definition in a particular statute when the "general object, or the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended from that required to be given by [the General Construction Law]." In that regard we note that, as a remedial statute, the Human Rights Law must be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficial purposes — one of which is to eliminate discrimination in "educational institutions" (Executive Law §§ 290, 300) — "and to spread its beneficial results as widely as possible" ( Matter of Rizzo v New York State Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 6 NY3d 104, 114; see Matter of Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Auth., 50 AD3d 1353, 1355-1356, aff'd 13 NY3d 223).