Claimant appeals and we affirm. Dissatisfaction with one's wages and promotional opportunities has been held not to constitute good cause for leaving employment ( see, Matter of Crivelli [Hartnett], 179 A.D.2d 858; Matter of Houghton [Hartnett], 167 A.D.2d 665; see also, Matter of Hoover [Sweeney], 232 A.D.2d 808). Furthermore, even if claimant had received a poor performance evaluation from her employer as she had anticipated, such criticism would not constitute good cause for leaving her employment ( see, e.g., Matter of Rugelis [Pfaudler Co. — Sweeney], 248 A.D.2d 784). Under these circumstances, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that claimant left her employment for personal and noncompelling reasons. Claimant's remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
We disagree. An employee who leaves a job because of dissatisfaction with the amount of his or her salary has not left for "good cause" ( see, Matter of Cattan [French European Publs. — Hudacs], 187 A.D.2d 858; Matter of Crivelli [Hartnett], 179 A.D.2d 858), nor is it good cause to leave a job due to an increase in workload ( see, Matter of Rosenfield [Hudacs], 205 A.D.2d 823). We find that the record contains substantial evidence that claimant left her employment of her own volition because of her dissatisfaction with her salary and workload, thereby justifying the Board's conclusion that claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause.