Summary
In Matter of Clamp, 193 A.D.2d 601 (2d Dep't 1993), the appellate division affirmed the Surrogate's determination that the doctrine of res judicata precluded an executor's attempt to relitigate claims that the decedent's inter vivos transfer of real property was the product of fraud, duress or undue influence.
Summary of this case from In re Estate of WagnerOpinion
May 3, 1993
Appeal from the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County (Radigan, S.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, we find that the Surrogate correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata precludes her from relitigating claims that the decedent's conveyance of her house prior to her death should be set aside on the grounds of fraud, duress, or undue influence. As a general rule, the doctrine of res judicata gives "`binding effect to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and prevents the parties to an action, and those in privity with them, from subsequently relitigating any questions that were necessarily decided therein'" (Watts v Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 277; see, Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481). Although privity has been described as "an amorphous term not susceptible to ease of application" (Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v Lopez, supra, at 486), privity exists where the connection between the parties is such that "the interests of the nonparty can be said to have been represented by the prior proceeding" (Green v Santa Fe Indus., 70 N.Y.2d 244, 253; Israel v Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 118-120).
At bar, while the petitioner was not a party to a prior action in the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in her capacity as the decedent's administrator, she and the remaining distributees of the estate were all parties to the prior action as individuals, and their competing interests were fully represented in the litigation. Moreover, "[t]here are instances in which a party suing in a representative capacity, but personally benefiting if a recovery is procured in either action, may be barred by an adverse decision in the prior action from instituting the second action" (Weiner v Greyhound Bus Lines, 55 A.D.2d 189, 193-194). Since the petitioner would personally benefit if the relief she seeks is granted in the Surrogate's Court proceeding, she may not circumvent the doctrine of res judicata, "so necessary to conserve judicial resources by discouraging redundant litigation" (Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v Lopez, supra, at 485), by relitigating her claims in her representative capacity.
We have examined the petitioner's remaining contentions, and find that they are without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Santucci, JJ., concur.