Summary
holding the family court improperly adjudged a juvenile delinquent for a crime not charged in the petition and not a lesser included offense
Summary of this case from In re Jason TOpinion
March 28, 1991
Appeal from the Family Court of Otsego County (Kepner, Jr., J.).
On December 5, 1988, a fire in the Worcester Central High School in Otsego County damaged the school's auditorium. Respondent admitted that he ignited a piece of paper located on a cart in the auditorium in response to his friend's goading. Subsequently, a petition was filed to have respondent adjudged a juvenile delinquent for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of arson in the second degree (Penal Law § 150.15). After a hearing, Family Court concluded that reasonable doubt existed regarding whether respondent had committed arson, but sua sponte determined that the facts supported a finding that respondent had committed criminal mischief in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 145.00). Accordingly, it found respondent to be a juvenile delinquent, placed him on probation for two years, and ordered him to make restitution in the amount of $250. Respondent maintains that reversal is required because Family Court impermissibly substituted a crime for that charged in the petition which was not a lesser included offense of the charged crime. We agree.
Family Court may adjudge a juvenile to be delinquent upon any lesser included offense of that originally charged in the petition (Matter of Raymond O., 31 N.Y.2d 730, 731; see, CPL 360.50; compare, Matter of Matthew P., 161 A.D.2d 1195; Matter of Edward S., 80 A.D.2d 585, 586; Matter of Anthony F., 68 Misc.2d 718, 720). Criminal mischief in the fourth degree is not, however, a lesser included offense of arson in the second degree because it is possible to commit the greater crime, for example, by setting fire to one's own residence, without concomitantly committing the lesser (see, People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61, 63).
And, as for petitioner's suggestion that we are at liberty to modify the order to reflect a finding, allegedly justified by the evidence, of reckless endangerment in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.20) or reckless endangerment of property (Penal Law § 145.25), it suffices to say that inasmuch as respondent was acquitted of the crime charged, we are powerless to do so (see, People v Luther, 61 N.Y.2d 724, 726).
Order reversed, on the law, with costs, and petition dismissed. Mahoney, P.J., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur.