Opinion
June 2, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McNulty, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated August 6, 1996, is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying a motion for reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.
In December 1995 the appellant George Prinz served a demand for arbitration upon the petitioners, Jose Ernesto Carranza and Donald Gold, of a controversy regarding an alleged breach of a contract for the purchase of stock. The petitioners commenced the instant proceeding for a permanent stay of the arbitration, arguing that the appellant's demand for arbitration in December 1995 of a controversy regarding a breach of contract involved a claim that had accrued in June 1989 and that would be barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations had it been asserted in State court (see, CPLR 7502 [b]). The Supreme Court granted the petition and permanently stayed the arbitration. We affirm.
CPLR 7502 (b) bars arbitration if the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations had it been asserted in a court of law (see, CPLR 7502 [b]; see also, Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 N.Y.2d 1, 9, n 2; Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 394). CPLR 213 provides that an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, is to be commenced within six years (see, CPLR 213), and a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues when the breach occurs (see, Goicoechea v. Law Offs. of Stephen R. Kihl, 234 A.D.2d 507; Garden City Imaging Ctr. v Lawrence Walsh, 234 A.D.2d 414; see also, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 81 N.Y.2d 399, 402; Tal-Spons Corp. v. Nurnberg, 213 A.D.2d 395, 396).
Here, a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrued in June 1989 when the petitioners allegedly failed to perform their obligations under the contract. The appellant's demand for arbitration on December 22, 1995, made more than six years thereafter, was outside the statutory time limit for breach of contract actions and thus arbitration of the claim is time-barred pursuant to CPLR 7502 (b).
Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Krausman, JJ., concur.