We review the district court's dismissal of this appeal on mootness grounds de novo.Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1989). While our resolution of the sanctions and mootness issues leaves us no occasion to review any of the district court's other determinations, we briefly address Property Movers' citation of In re Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465 (4th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that Article III concerns require de novo reexamination of both the legal and factual conclusions of bankruptcy courts. This assertion is based on a failure to apprehend the difference between core and noncore proceedings.
Given the Bankruptcy Court's resolution of this case in favor of OneWest Bank on summary judgment, this Court must apply a de novo standard. In re Campbell, 812 F. 2d 1465, 1467 (4th Cir. 1987). ANALYSIS
Whether a contract is sufficiently definite so as to be enforceable is a conclusion of law subject to de novo review. See In re Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465, 1467 (4th Cir. 1987); Sea-bulk Offshore Ltd. v. American Home Assurance Co., 377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004). ("The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law that turns upon a reading of the document itself").
Though both parties submit that a district court reviews findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and reviews de novo any questions of law, Appellee later claims that the court should review the decision to lift an automatic stay under the abuse of discretion standard. See In re Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465 (4th Cir. 1987) (A district court reviews findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and conclusions of law under a de novo standard.); In re Robbins, 964 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1991) (A decision to overturn the lifting of an automatic stay will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.).
Rather, this court may review the order de novo. See In the Matter of Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the district court did not err in reviewing de novo bankruptcy court's decision in non-core proceeding). Both Turner and FBI, however, suffer from confusion regarding the turnover provisions of 11 U.S.C. ยง 542 and 543. Ordinarily, a custodian of the debtor's property must deliver the property to the bankruptcy trustee upon filing of the bankruptcy petition.
This Court has reviewed the factual findings by the bankruptcy judge under a clearly erroneous standard of review, Bankr.R. 8013, and has reviewed the conclusions of law under a de novo standard of review. In re Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465, 1467 (4th Cir.1987). The order denying the motion to recuse was reviewed for abuse of discretion.
In reviewing the bankruptcy court's ruling on summary judgment this court must apply a de novo standard. In re Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465, 1467 (4th Cir. 1987). Judith Halverson argues that she holds equitable title to or an interest in Richard Halverson's assets pursuant to the Equitable Distribution Judgment. Alternatively, she argues that she holds an equitable title or interest as the beneficiary of a constructive trust which arose when her interest in the marital assets was transferred to Richard Halverson by the Equitable Distribution Judgment.
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8013, findings of fact by the Bankruptcy Court shall not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. In The Matter of Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465 (4th Cir. 1987). Issues of law are to be reviewed de novo.
Section 157(c)(1) neither requires nor precludes new evidence, and it does not require a trial de novo extenso. If the district court finds in its de novo review that the record is unclear or incomplete and that additional evidence must be taken, the Court has discretion to order the parties to present the evidence to it directly or to refer the case back to the bankruptcy court. In re Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465 (4th Cir. 1987); Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984) ( De novo review requires the district court to make an independent judgment of the issues); In re Price-Watson Co., 66 B.R. 144, 147-52 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex. 1986). To support its claim that the bankruptcy judge was biased against it, Cemco focuses on one incident that it argues provoked the bankruptcy judge's "displeasure with counsel," and that the judge's displeasure "color[ed] all subsequent proceedings, including `trial' on the [Bank's foreclosure]."
De novo review requires me to make an independent judgment of the issues. Matter of Campbell, 812 F.2d 1465, 1467 (4th Cir. 1987); Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984). In doing so, I have examined the entire record in this matter.