Petitioner contends that, by filing its action against Moran, the three-year statute of limitations (see Matter of Motor Veh.Acc. Indem. Corp. , 89 NY2d 214 ) on its claims against respondent were tolled, even though respondent had not been served or named in that action. Matter of Brua Cab Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co. (275 AD2d 778 [2000] ) and Matter of Brinks, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (217 AD2d 620 [1995] ), cited by petitioner, are inapplicable, as the subsequent arbitration cannot be related back to an action filed against a different party. The arbitrators' determination that petitioner was not entitled to reimbursement for the benefits it had paid was not arbitrary or capricious.
Brua and Washington contend that the arbitrator misapplied the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214), and should not have awarded Royal reimbursement for any payments made more then three years before the filing of the claims for arbitration. However, the arbitration claims related back to the inadvertent commencement of the action at law, which was timely (see, 11 NYCRR 65.10[d][5][i]; Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 221-222; Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 A.D.2d 412; Matter of Brinks, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 217 A.D.2d 620, 621). Therefore, the arbitrator's award will not be disturbed, as it was supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious (see, Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., supra).
The Supreme Court properly stayed the arbitration on the ground that the three-year Statute of Limitations to recover first-party benefits had expired (see,Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 221; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car, 237 A.D.2d 153;City of Syracuse v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 83 A.D.2d 116, 118-121, affd 61 N.Y.2d 691). State Farm failed to demonstrate that it had timely interposed a claim for first-party benefits in its litigation against the insureds of Liberty Mutual. Therefore, it was not entitled to the benefit of 11 NYCRR 65.10(d)(5)(i), which would permit arbitration on the issue of first-party benefits to go forward where initially a claim for such benefits was timely but mistakenly placed in litigation rather than made the subject of an arbitration (cf., Matter of Brinks, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 217 A.D.2d 620). MANGANO, P.J., RITTER, JOY, McGINITY, and SMITH, JJ., concur.
The Supreme Court properly stayed the arbitration on the ground that the three-year Statute of Limitations to recover first-party benefits had expired ( see, Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Gas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 221; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car, 237 A.D.2d 153; City of Syracuse v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 83 A.D.2d 116, 118-121, affd 61 N.Y.2d 691). State Farm failed to demonstrate that it had timely interposed a claim for first-party benefits in its litigation against the insureds of Liberty Mutual. Therefore, it was not entitled to the benefit of 11 N.Y.CRR 65. 10(d)(5)(i), which would permit arbitration on the issue of first-party benefits to go forward where initially a claim for such benefits was timely but mistakenly placed in litigation rather than made the subject of an arbitration ( cf., Matter of Brinks, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 217 A.D.2d 620). MANGANO, P.J., RITTER, JOY, McGINITY, and SMITH, JJ., concur.