Petitioner should have been restored to her position by April 16, 2008 instead of on August 18, 2008. Petitioner's case is similar to Boyland v Town of Yorktown ( 179 AD2d 753 [2d Dept 1992]), cited by respondents. There, Supreme Court determined that the petitioner was wrongfully removed from his position effective February 29, 1986, and was restored to his position on June 24, 1989.
The New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division has applied § 5001(b) and determined that, for purposes of calculating prejudgment interest in an employment discrimination case pursuant to the NYSHRL, damages should be calculated “from a single reasonable intermediate date,” which “would be the date halfway between the date the plaintiff was first deprived of a paycheck and the date of the verdict.” Jattan, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 113; see also Argyle Realty Associates v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 65 A.D.3d 273, 882 N.Y.S.2d 458, 468 (2009) (“Given that the complainant incurred damages for each pay period between her unlawful termination by Argyle Realty in November 1995 and her commencement of new employment in September 1996, it was proper to calculate interest from April 15, 1996, as a ‘single reasonable intermediate date.’ ” (citing CPLR 5001(b) and Matter of Boylan v. Town of Yorktown, 179 A.D.2d 753, 579 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1992))).
Here, the award of predetermination interest on the award for back pay, from April 15, 1996, was appropriate to make the complainant whole. Given that the complainant incurred damages for each pay period between her unlawful termination by Argyle Realty in November 1995 and her commencement of new employment in September 1996, it was proper to calculate interest from April 15, 1996, as a "single reasonable intermediate date" (CPLR 5001 [b]; see Matter of Boylan v Town of Yorktown, 179 AD2d 753, 754).
With respect to interest on the award of back pay, such was properly denied since the operative statute (Administrative Code § 14-123) makes no provision therefor ( see Rachlin Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc., 33 A.D.2d 370, 373). For the reasons stated above, it does not avail plaintiff that interest is awarded in cases governed by Civil Service Law § 77 ( e.g. Matter of Della Vecchia v. Town of N. Hempstead, 207 A.D.2d 483; Matter of Boylan v. Town of Yorktown, 179 A.D.2d 753, 754). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
Since a suspended tenured teacher has a property interest in his salary, the petitioner is entitled to recover the back pay that was wrongfully withheld (see, McCreery v Babylon Union Free School Dist., 827 F. Supp. 136; Matter of Kohler v Board of Educ., 142 A.D.2d 676, 678; Matter of Boylan v Town of Yorktown, 179 A.D.2d 753), less any substitute income that he earned (see, Matter of Gross v Board of Educ., 159 A.D.2d 465, 467; Matter of Hawley v South Orangetown Cent. School Dist., 98 A.D.2d 749, affd 67 N.Y.2d 796, 797), with appropriate interest on the balance (Matter of Kohler v Board of Educ., supra; CPLR 5001 [b]). Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Thompson and Hart, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs. Contrary to the Town's contention, the petitioner was entitled to recover back pay. Deduction of any compensation earned by the petitioner from other employment was not warranted (see, Civil Service Law § 77; see also, Matter of Boylan v. Town of Yorktown, 179 A.D.2d 753). Moreover, accrued interest on the back pay was properly awarded (see, Matter of Kohler v. Board of Educ., 142 A.D.2d 676). We disagree with the petitioner's contention raised on his cross-appeal that he was entitled to accrued leave compensation.