Matter of Boy

15 Citing cases

  1. In re Matigan G.

    145 A.D.3d 1484 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    f neglect for repeated misuse of drugs is inapplicable to the facts of this case (see Family Ct. Act § 1046[a][iii] ), we nevertheless conclude that Family Court could properly consider evidence that the mother voluntarily possessed and used illegal substances in conjunction with her mental health prescription medication during the episode of paranoid delusions on January 16, 2015 (see generally Matter of Andrew DeJ. R., 30 A.D.3d 238, 239, 817 N.Y.S.2d 24 ), and that she subsequently told an investigator that she "believed that other people were administering [drugs] to her so that she would test positive so that she would appear crazy."Thus, in light of the evidence of the mother's mental illness, and "[g]iven the absence of adequate proof as to the [mother's] willingness to accept medical treatment, or as to the efficacy of whatever treatment might exist," the subject children would be faced with a " ‘substantial probability of neglect’ " should they be released back to the mother (Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 A.D.2d 512, 512, 589 N.Y.S.2d 587 ). We therefore conclude that the court properly determined that the children were neglected as a result of the mother's mental illness (see Thomas B., 139 A.D.3d at 1403, 31 N.Y.S.3d 381 ; see generally Nicholson, 3 N.Y.3d at 368, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840 ).

  2. Onondaga Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sara E.W.-G. (In re Matigan G.)

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 8648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

    utory presumption of neglect for repeated misuse of drugs is inapplicable to the facts of this case (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [iii]), we nevertheless conclude that Family Court could properly consider evidence that the mother voluntarily possessed and used illegal substances in conjunction with her mental health prescription medication during the episode of paranoid delusions on January 16, 2015 (see generally Matter of Andrew DeJ. R., 30 AD3d 238, 239), and that she subsequently told an investigator that she "believed that other people were administering [drugs] to her so that she would test positive so that she would appear crazy." Thus, in light of the evidence of the mother's mental illness, and "[g]iven the absence of adequate proof as to the [mother's] willingness to accept medical treatment, or as to the efficacy of whatever treatment might exist," the subject children would be faced with a " substantial probability of neglect' " should they be released back to the mother (Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 AD2d 512, 512). We therefore conclude that the court properly determined that the children were neglected as a result of the mother's mental illness (see Thomas B., 139 AD3d at 1403; see generally Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 368).

  3. In re Andrew

    73 A.D.3d 1036 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 31 times

    The Family Court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to considerable deference unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 776; Matter of Aminat O., 20 AD3d 480). The Family Court's finding that the mother's mental condition caused impairment, or an imminent danger of impairment, to the physical, mental, or emotional condition of her daughter, Jasmine, was supported by a preponderance of the evidence ( see Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i]; § 1046 [b] [i]; Matter of Ifeiye O., 53 AD3d 501; Matter of Caress S., 250 AD2d 490; Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Diane B., 231 AD2d 523; Matter of Child Welfare Admin, v Jennifer A, 218 AD2d 694; Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 AD2d 512). Jasmine's testimony was not incredible.

  4. In re Jayvien

    70 A.D.3d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 29 times
    In Jayvien E., the First Department reversed the trial court's finding of neglect and held that the agency failed to prove that the mother had a mental illness that impaired her child or placed him in imminent danger.

    Expert testimony or a definitive psychiatric diagnosis is not required to show a parent suffers from a mental illness because "the consequences of the proceedings are temporary rather than permanent" ( Matter of Zariyasta S., 158 AD2d 45, 48; see also Matter of Caress S., 250 AD2d 490). However, the quantum of evidence presented at a fact-finding hearing must be "sufficient to prove that if the child [were] released to the mother there [would be] a substantial probability of neglect" that places the child at risk ( Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 AD2d 512 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Matter of Danielle M., 151 AD2d 240; Matter of Eugene G., 76 AD2d 781, appeal dismissed 51 NY2d 878). Here, the record contains no evidence sufficient to support the hearing court's finding of "a link or causal connection between the basis for the neglect petition and the circumstances that allegedly produce the child's impairment or imminent danger of impairment" ( Nicholson v Scoppetta, 3 NY3d at 369).

  5. In re Kayla

    47 A.D.3d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Although it is well settled that neither expert testimony nor a definitive psychiatric diagnosis are necessary to establish a finding of neglect predicated upon a parent's mental illness ( Matter of Caress S., 250 AD2d 490 [1st Dept 1998]; Matter of Zariyasta S., 158 AD2d 45 [1st Dept 1990]) nevertheless, the quantum of proof should, at the very least, include demonstrable behavioral manifestations on the part of the parent sufficient to support a conclusion that there would be a "substantial probability of neglect" causing the subject child to be at risk if placed in the parent's custody. ( Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 AD2d 512 [2d Dept 1992]; Matter of Eugene G., 76 AD2d 781, lv dismissed 51 NY2d 878.) I fail to see that such a conclusion is permitted here.

  6. IN THE MATTER OF SOMA H

    306 A.D.2d 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 18 times

    In view of the father's mental condition, the psychiatrist believed that he should not be permitted to care for the child except under the direct supervision of another adult. As both the petitioner and law guardian contend, this evidence was sufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child is neglected within the meaning of Family Court Act § 1012(f)(i) ( see Matter of Lewis Y., 293 A.D.2d 684; Matter of Octavia S., supra; Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 A.D.2d 512). FEUERSTEIN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, GOLDSTEIN and RIVERA, JJ., concur.

  7. Matter of Commissioner, Soc. v. Rozella

    255 A.D.2d 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 20 times

    Therefore, the appeal from so much of the orders of disposition as determined that the children were neglected is not academic ( see, Matter of Eddie E., 219 A.D.2d 719; Matter of H. Children, 156 A.D.2d 520). The respondent proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, because of the mother's mental illness, the children were at imminent risk of danger if they were to be released to her care ( see, Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; Matter of Jesse DD., 223 A.D.2d 929; Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 A.D.2d 512). Contrary to the mother's contention, no showing of past or present harm to the children is necessary to support a finding of neglect ( see, Matter of Millar, 35 N.Y.2d 767; Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. [Raul B.] v. Diane B., 231 A.D.2d 523). Bracken, J. P., Santucci, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

  8. In re Theresa

    237 A.D.2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Contrary to the mother's contention, the petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject child was neglected ( see, Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; § 1012 [f] [i]). Indeed, the testimony demonstrated, inter alia, that the mother's behavior towards the child constituted conduct "requiring the aid of the court" (Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; see also, Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 AD2d 512; Matter of Danielle M., 151 AD2d 240). Additionally, the dispositional order is in the best interests of the child ( see, Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Trudy I.] v Leona W., 192 AD2d 602). The remaining contentions lack merit.

  9. Matter of Commissioner of Social Services

    224 A.D.2d 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)

    Ordered that the dispositional order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. We agree with the Family Court's determination that the subject child is a neglected child within the meaning of Family Court Act § 1012 (f) (see, Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 A.D.2d 512). Furthermore, the dispositional order is in the best interests of the child (see, Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Trudy I.] v. Leona W., 192 A.D.2d 602). Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

  10. Matter of Jesse

    223 A.D.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 33 times

    While mental illness will not, per se, support a finding of neglect ( see, Matter of Trina Marie H., 48 N.Y.2d 742, 743; Matter of Shelley Renea K., 79 A.D.2d 1073), proof of ongoing mental illness, along with the failure to engage in after-care treatment, which results in a parent's inability to care for his or her children in the foreseeable future, provides a basis for a finding of neglect ( see, Matter of Madeline R., supra, at 446; Matter of Naticia Q., 195 A.D.2d 616, 618; cf., Matter of H. Children, 156 A.D.2d 520). There is ample precedent for upholding a finding of neglect upon a showing that "'if the child [were] released to the mother there [would be] a substantial probability of neglect'" ( Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 A.D.2d 512, quoting Matter of Eugene G., 76 A.D.2d 781, 782; see, Matter of Moises D., 128 A.D.2d 775, 778). Notably, "[n]o showing of past or present harm to the children is necessary to support a finding of neglect" ( Matter of Madeline R., supra, at 446; see, Matter of Millar, 40 A.D.2d 637, affd 35 N.Y.2d 767) and "[t]he possibility of improvement of a parent's condition is insufficient to offset proof of the parent's mental illness and refusal to follow prescribed treatment" ( Matter of Naticia Q., supra, at 618; see, Matter of Vaketa Y., 141 A.D.2d 892, 893-894).