Opinion
October 24, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Herold, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that one first exhaust all available administrative channels before seeking relief in a judicial proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see, e.g., Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57; Young Men's Christian Assn. v Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 N.Y.2d 371, 375). However, the exhaustion doctrine is subject to certain exceptions. Where resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or its pursuit would cause irreparable injury or where the agency's action is being challenged as being unconstitutional or beyond the agency's grant of power, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.
The petitioner acknowledges that an appeal of the Superintendent's determination may be made to the Commissioner of Correctional Services ( 7 NYCRR 254.8) but argues that resort to such procedure would be futile because he will have served his time in the special housing unit before the administrative appeal could be determined. He also contends that his due process claims afford him standing to seek CPLR article 78 relief despite his failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies. We reject the petitioner's contentions. The Commissioner has the power to afford the petitioner adequate relief and nothing in the record indicates that the petitioner's claims have been predetermined (see, Matter of Grattan v Department of Social Servs., 131 A.D.2d 191, 193). Hence, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that pursuit of his administrative remedies would be futile.
The petitioner's claim that he was denied due process in the conduct of the Superintendent's hearing does not raise a valid constitutional issue for purpose of avoiding the exhaustion doctrine (see, Matter of Dozier v New York City, 130 A.D.2d 128, 134-135; cf., Matter of Hilton v Dalsheim, 81 A.D.2d 887). Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner must first pursue an appeal to the Commissioner before he can challenge the determination in court. Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Rubin, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.