The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists” (Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443–444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Hildreth v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 83 A.D.3d 838, 839, 921 N.Y.S.2d 137). Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207–a determination, a municipality is “free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another” (Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868;see Matter of Segura v. City of Long Beach, 230 A.D.2d 799, 646 N.Y.S.2d 823;Matter of Flynn v. Zaleski, 212 A.D.2d 706, 708, 622 N.Y.S.2d 791). Thus, even if “conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,” the municipality's determination, based on its own expert's conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence (Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d at 717, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868).
The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists” (Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443–444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Miserendino v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 A.D.3d 946, 947, 946 N.Y.S.2d 640;Matter of Hildreth v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 83 A.D.3d 838, 839, 921 N.Y.S.2d 137). Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207–a determination, a municipality is “free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another” (Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868;see Matter of Segura v. City of Long Beach, 230 A.D.2d 799, 646 N.Y.S.2d 823). Thus, even if “conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,” the municipality's determination, based on its own expert's conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence (Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d at 717, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868).
Given that the petitioner's application for General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) benefits has not yet been granted or denied by the respondent, we agree that the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative and contractual remedies ( see, CPLR 7801; Watergate II Apts. v. Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57; Matter of Cosgrove v. Klinger, 58 A.D.2d 910). Further, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a firefighter who qualifies for a line-of-duty disability retirement pension is not automatically entitled to the benefits of General Municipal Law § 207-a ( see, Matter of Sutka v. Conners, 73 N.Y.2d 395, 404; Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715 [decided herewith]; Matter of Barson v. Regan, 177 A.D.2d 21, 23; Matter of Flynn v. McLaughlin, 169 A.D.2d 768, 769), and the determination of whether to grant General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits must be made, in the first instance, by the municipal employer ( see, Matter of Barson v. Regan, supra; Matter of Flynn v. McLaughlin, supra; King v. City of Newburgh, 84 A.D.2d 388, 393). The Retirement and Social Security Law and the General Municipal Law are separate and distinct statutes with different eligibility requirements and, as such, eligibility for one does not mandate eligibility for the other (see, Matter of Sutka v. Conners, supra).
The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists'" (Matter of Solano v City of Mount Vernon, 108 AD3d at 677, quoting Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443-444; see Matter of Miserendino v City of Mount Vernon, 96 AD3d at 947). "Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207-a determination, a municipality is free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another'" (Matter of Solano v City of Mount Vernon, 108 AD3d at 677, quoting Matter of Bernhard v Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 AD2d 715, 716; see Matter of Segura v City of Long Beach, 230 AD2d 799). "Thus, even if conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,' the municipality's determination, based on its own expert's conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Solano v City of Mount Vernon, 108 AD3d at 677, quoting Matter of Bernhard v Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 AD2d at 717).
After a hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that petitioner could perform the duties of a police officer and denied his application. We agree with respondents that the Hearing Officer's determination that petitioner was able to perform his regular duties is supported by substantial evidence ( see generally Matter of Clouse v. Allegany County, 46 A.D.3d 1381, 1381–1382, 849 N.Y.S.2d 372;Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716–717, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868). We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit.
Finally, to the extent that plaintiff's request can even be considered an application for "benefits" under General Municipal Law § 207-a, defendants have not made a determination as to his eligibility (which they are statutorily entitled to do after a medical examination), thereby providing another basis upon which to find that the current action is not properly before this Court ( see, Matter of D'Onofrio v. City of Mount Vernon, 226 A.D.2d 719, 719-720; Matter of Gooshaw v. Village of Massena, 216 A.D.2d 819, 821). To this end, we note that whether an injury occurred in the course of firefighting duties is one of two necessary factors upon which General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits are dependant, the other being physical inability to perform regular duties ( see, Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716; see also, General Municipal Law § 207-a). As noted, the determination of the Workers' Compensation Board does not determine that plaintiff has a continuing disability or current physical inability to perform his duties.
The hearing officer's determination that the petitioner did not suffer from a work-related injury is supported by substantial evidence ( see Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v. Schiano, 16 N.Y.3d 494, 499, 922 N.Y.S.2d 249, 947 N.E.2d 140;300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183;Matter of Collins v. Codd, 38 N.Y.2d 269, 270, 379 N.Y.S.2d 733, 342 N.E.2d 524;Matter of Davenport v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 A.D.3d 838, 946 N.Y.S.2d 214). Contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the testimony of the respondents' expert was consistent and supported by the medical evidence, and the hearing officer was free to credit that expert's testimony over the testimony of the petitioner's treating physicians ( see Matter of Miserendino v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 A.D.3d 946, 946 N.Y.S.2d 640;Texter v. Middletown Dialysis Ctr., Inc., 22 A.D.3d 831, 803 N.Y.S.2d 687;Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868). The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.
Ordered that the judgment as amended is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed. Because the petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies before instituting this proceeding, the judgment as amended must be reversed and the proceeding must be dismissed ( see, CPLR 7801; Young Men's Christian Assn. v Rochester Pure Water Dist., 37 NY2d 371, 375; Matter of Bernhardv Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 AD2d 715; Matter of D'Onofrio v City of Mount Vernon, 226 AD2d 719; Matter of Di Pietro v State Ins. Fund, 206 AD2d 211, 214-215; Doe v St. Clare's Hosp. Health Ctr., 194 AD2d 365, 366; see also, Matter of Dawson v Gibson, 176 AD2d 876, 877). Moreover, contrary to the petitioner's contentions, the fact that he was awarded an accident disability retirement pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law § 363 does not automatically entitle him to disability differential payments pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) ( see, Matter of Cook v City of Utica, 88 NY2d 833).
The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists' ” ( Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443–444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193; see Matter of Miserendino v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 A.D.3d at 947, 946 N.Y.S.2d 640). “Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207–a determination, a municipality is ‘free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another’ ” ( Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868; see Matter of Segura v. City of Long Beach, 230 A.D.2d 799, 646 N.Y.S.2d 823). “Thus, even if ‘conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,’ the municipality's determination, based on its own expert's conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence” ( Matter of Solano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter of Bernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d at 717, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868).
"The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [an agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" ( Matter ofBerenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). "Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207–a determination, a municipality is ‘free to credit one physician's testimony over that of another’ " ( Matter ofSolano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter ofBernhard v. Hartsdale Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d 715, 716, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868 ; see Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 988–989, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ). "Thus, even if ‘conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,’ the municipality's determination, based on its own expert's conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence" ( Matter ofSolano v. City of Mount Vernon, 108 A.D.3d at 677, 969 N.Y.S.2d 528, quoting Matter of Bernhard v. Hartside Fire Dist., 226 A.D.2d at 717, 641 N.Y.S.2d 868 ; see Matter ofDelgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d at 989, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ).