Matter of Bd. of Educ

17 Citing cases

  1. In re the Arbitration between Board of Education of Bedford Central School District & Bedford Teachers Ass'n

    67 A.D.2d 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)   Cited 4 times

    This apparently was also the position taken by Special Term. However, the unit or nonunit status of the nurses is not germane to the question of arbitrability. "[A] union may invoke grievance and arbitration procedures on behalf of a nonmember whose treatment by a common employer may adversely affect the position of its own members (Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, 39, mot for lv to app den 38 N.Y.2d 740)." (Matter of South Colonie Cent. School Dist. v. Longo, 43 N.Y.2d 136, 141.)

  2. Belmont Central School District v. Belmont Teachers Ass'n

    51 A.D.2d 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)   Cited 15 times

    In its refusal to grant any form of injunction Special Term properly held that the threshold question — whether the two teachers aggrieved are regular or substitute teachers and whether they are members of the bargaining unit — required an interpretation of the agreement and, therefore, was arbitrable. We recently restated and summarized the applicable principles of law in Matter of Board of Educ. of Enlarged City School Dist. of City of Auburn [Auburn Teachers Assn.] ( 49 A.D.2d 35, 38) where we stated: "It is clear that the avowed public policy of this State as expressed by the Legislature in section 200 Civ. Serv. of the Civil Service Law, commonly known as the Taylor Law, is to encourage voluntary resolution of labor disputes involving public employees through forums such as arbitration (Matter of City School Dist. of City of Poughkeepsie [Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Assn], 35 N.Y.2d 599; Matter of Long Is. Lbr. Co. [Martin], 15 N.Y.2d 380; City of Auburn v Nash, 34 A.D.2d 345; Central School Dist. No. 1 v Litz, 60 Misc.2d 1009, affd 34 A.D.2d 1092). Where a collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause, disputes arising thereunder are presumptively arbitrable in the absence of clear contractual language to the contrary (Matter of Long Is. Lbr. Co. [Martin], supra; Board of Educ. of Chautauqua Cent. School Dist. v Chautauqua Cent. School Teachers Assn., 41 A.D.2d 47).

  3. North Syracuse Cent School Dist

    45 N.Y.2d 195 (N.Y. 1978)   Cited 39 times

    There are recognized factors other than strictly monetary ones, such as evaluation of performance, possibility of tenure, maintenance of skills, fostering of a desirable work environment, and the like, which impel employees to bargain for, and employers voluntarily to consent to, job security clauses. From the stand-point of the union, in securing the rights of individual workers it may be seen as properly protective of its members' collective interests (cf. Matter of South Colonie Cent. School Dist. v Longo, 43 N.Y.2d 136; Matter of Burke v Bowen, 40 N.Y.2d 264; Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, mot for lv to app den 38 N.Y.2d 740). For such reasons, unless constrained by the arbitration agreement, an arbitrator might well determine that wrongful discharge of an employee is not fully compensable solely in dollars and cents, and, accordingly, an award which couples payment of lost wages with a prospective order of reinstatement is not to be disturbed on that ground alone.

  4. South Colonie School v. Longo

    43 N.Y.2d 136 (N.Y. 1977)   Cited 21 times

    Moving then to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, preliminarily we observe that, even absent a no-reprisal clause, a union may invoke grievance and arbitration procedures on behalf of a nonmember whose treatment by a common employer may adversely affect the position of its own members (Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, 39, mot for lv to app den 38 N.Y.2d 740). A fortiori, it may do so when a no-reprisal agreement exists.

  5. Matter of Sokol v. Granville Central School [3d Dept 1999

    260 A.D.2d 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 8 times

    Further, there is also no proof in the record that the Association was representing petitioner's interests in filing the grievance. While the grievance concededly challenges respondent's filling of four alleged teaching assistant vacancies and notes that such positions were then held by four individuals hired as substitutes (including petitioner), it does not seek as its desired settlement that petitioner be interviewed as a candidate or that petitioner be immediately appointed to a permanent position (compare, Matter of Board of Educ. of Enlarged City School Dist. of City of Auburn [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, lv. denied 38 N.Y.2d 740). Thus, petitioner persuasively argues that even if the Association is ultimately successful, there is no guarantee that he personally would benefit from the victory.

  6. Matter of Newfield Central School District

    258 A.D.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    In its "Statement of Grievance", respondent invoked only the recognition clause of the collective bargaining agreement, which defines the negotiation unit of which respondent is the exclusive representative, as being violated by petitioner's conduct in subcontracting with BOCES ( compare, Matter of Board of Educ. [Bedford Teachers Assn.], supra [teachers association alleged violations of not only recognition clause but also teacher protection and reciprocal rights provisions of the collective' bargaining agreement]; Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, lv denied 38 N.Y.2d 740 [teachers association alleged violations of not only recognition clause but also salary, cooperation and joint code of ethics provisions of the collective bargaining agreement]). The collective bargaining agreement at issue here is totally silent on the issue of petitioner's participation in BOCES programs or authority to subcontract in general ( compare, Matter of Watkins Glen Cent. School Dist. [Watkins Glen Faculty Assn.], 212 A.D.2d 34 [collective bargaining agreement between parties contained provision prohibiting school district from subcontracting teaching assignments]).

  7. Matter of Baran v. Otterbein

    84 A.D.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    Special Term denied respondents' motion to dismiss, referred the matter to a Referee for a hearing and continued the temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the memorandum. The public policy in New York as expressed by the Legislature in the "Taylor Law" is to encourage voluntary resolution of labor disputes involving public employees through forums such as arbitration (Civil Service Law, § 200 et seq.; Belmont Cent. School Dist. v. Belmont Teachers Assn., 51 A.D.2d 653; Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, 38; Matter of City School Dist. of City of Poughkeepsie [Poughkeepsie Public School Teachers Assn.], 35 N.Y.2d 599). A review of this record reveals that the collective bargaining agreement between the parties contains a broad arbitration clause that would encompass this dispute.

  8. County of Broome v. Sheriffs

    57 A.D.2d 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)

    We note, in addition, that the subject agreement covers public employees. "It is clear that the avowed public policy of this State as expressed by the Legislature in section 200 Civ. Serv. of the Civil Service Law, commonly known as the Taylor Law, is to encourage voluntary resolution of labor disputes involving public employees through forums such as arbitration" (Matter of Board of Educ. of Enlarged City School Dist. of City of Auburn [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, 38, mot for lv to app den 38 N.Y.2d 740). The broadness of the arbitration clause contained in the instant collective bargaining agreement between the public employer and its employees leads us to conclude that Special Term properly denied the application for a stay and ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration.

  9. Bd. of Educ. of W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist. v. W. Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n

    55 A.D.2d 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)   Cited 5 times

    The initial question as to whether an issue is arbitrable should be determined in the first instance by the arbitrator. The only instances in which an application to stay arbitration should be granted are: (1) where there is no valid agreement to arbitrate or where the agreement unmistakably excludes the subject; (2) where the agreement to arbitrate has not been complied with; (3) where the claim sought to be arbitrated is barred by a time limitation; and (4) where an identifiable public policy prohibits arbitration of the issue (CPLR art 75; Matter of Acting Superintendent, Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v United Liverpool Faculty Assn., 53 A.D.2d 239, mot for lv to app den 40 N.Y.2d 804; Belmont Cent. School Dist. v Belmont Teachers' Assn., 51 A.D.2d 653, 654; Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, 38, mot for lv to app den 38 N.Y.2d 740). The Association alleged a violation of section B of article XV of the agreement by unilateral changes of terms and conditions of employment of unit members brought about by Board Policy No. T5161 and its supplement, No. T5161S.

  10. Kepp v. Springville-Griffith Institute Central School District

    55 A.D.2d 1033 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)   Cited 7 times

    His only complaint appears to be that he was denied tenure, for he has not alleged any other reason for arbitration. For this reason petitioner claims that the demand for arbitration must be stayed; and we agree. We recognize, of course, that any dispute under a contract containing a clause for arbitration is presumptively arbitrable (Steelworkers v American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564; Matter of Board of Educ. [Auburn Teachers Assn.], 49 A.D.2d 35, 38) and that whenever there is an arbitrable issue, an arbitrator should be given the opportunity to render a lawful award (see Matter of Niagara Wheatfield Admin. Assn. v Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist., 54 A.D.2d 498). Nevertheless, in the absence of a specific allegation of an issue to be arbitrated we find no justification for subjecting the parties to the expense and trouble of an arbitration proceeding. It is against public policy for a school board to relinquish "its authority to terminate the employment of a non-tenured teacher at the end of the probationary period", and so the question of the termination of respondent Kepp at the end of his probationary term, "without just cause", is not a subject for arbitration (Matter of Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 N.Y.2d 774, 777; Matter of Niagara Wheatfield Admin. Assn. v Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist., supra; Matter of Morris Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v Morris Educ. Assn., 54 A.D.2d 1044; Matter