Opinion
May 5, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (David Saxe, J.).
Petitioner, in seeking to vacate the subject arbitration award, has not met his burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, actual bias on the part of the arbitrators (see, e.g., Matter of Kessler Motor Cars v. Ferrari N. Am., 245 A.D.2d 209). Nor has petitioner demonstrated that there was an appearance of partiality based on an undisclosed conflict of interest (see, e.g., New York Rests. Exch. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 226 A.D.2d 312, 315, lv dismissed 89 N.Y.2d 861). Nor can the award be vacated upon the ground that the underlying contract was misconstrued by the arbitrators, since, even if we disagreed with the arbitrators, it would not be proper to substitute our construction of the contract for theirs (see, Maross Constr. v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 66 N.Y.2d 341, 346). Finally, the IAS Court, in adjudicating this application pursuant to CPLR article 75, properly included in its disposition provisions needed to implement and prevent circumvention of the award (see, Bogard v. Paul, 242 A.D.2d 479), including those prohibiting petitioner from acting through an entity he clearly controls (cf., International Bhd. of Teamsters [Castwell Foundry Corp.], 37 Misc.2d 31). We have considered the remaining arguments of both petitioner-appellant and the nonparty appellant, and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Lerner, P. J., Nardelli, Wallach, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.