Opinion
December 19, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Shaheen, J.
Present — Callahan, J.P., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
Determination unanimously confirmed and petition dismissed, without costs. Memorandum: Following a hearing, petitioner, a taxicab driver, was found guilty of 16 violations of the City of Syracuse Ground Transportation Ordinance. Respondent suspended petitioner's license for 90 days and fined him $100. Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding alleging that the Corporation Counsel's refusal to grant his demands for prehearing discovery, coupled with an allegedly vague notice of the charges against him, inhibited his defense and denied him a full and fair hearing as required by Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan ( 307 N.Y. 461).
Initially, we note that since the issues petitioner raises are questions of law, not substantial evidence, this matter should not have been transferred to this court in the first instance (CPLR 7804 [g]). Since the record before us is sufficient to dispose of the issues raised we will then decide them as if the matter had been presented properly (Matter of Consumer Protection Bd. v. Public Serv. Commn., 85 A.D.2d 321, 323, appeal dismissed 57 N.Y.2d 673; Matter of Shook v. Lavine, 49 A.D.2d 238, 239-240).
The notice of the charges against petitioner specified each act of misconduct, the date and place where it occurred, and the particular section of the ordinance petitioner allegedly violated. Thus, the notice was reasonably calculated to apprise petitioner of the charges against him so as to enable him to adequately prepare and present a defense (Matter of Fitzgerald v Libous, 44 N.Y.2d 660, 661; Moise v. Christian, 97 A.D.2d 536, 537; Matter of Bateman v. City of Ogdensburg, 55 A.D.2d 781; Orchard Park Cent. School Dist. v. Orchard Park Teachers Assn., 50 A.D.2d 462, 469, appeal dismissed 38 N.Y.2d 911; cf. Montrois v. City of Watertown, 115 A.D.2d 298). Petitioner's reliance upon Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan (supra) is misplaced. The issue there was whether a license could be revoked based upon evidence belatedly presented at the close of an administrative hearing when the petitioner had no advance notice that the evidence would be considered. That is not the case here since the findings of petitioner's misconduct were confined to the specific charges of which petitioner was adequately notified.
The penalty imposed was considerably less than the maximum provided in the ordinance and under the circumstances was not disproportionate to the misconduct found by the Hearing Officer and affirmed by the respondent.